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FROM KYOTO TO QUITO: REASSESSING OIL MORATORIUM
AS AN EFFECTIVE CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY FROM A
PROPERTY-BASED APPROACH
PATRICK WIELAND
I. INTRODUCTION
Leaving oil reserves unexploited in exchange for economic
compensation has recently been put forward as an innovative climate
change policy. Some scholars have praised this idea for establishing the
foundations of the "new economics of planet Earth"' and for having the
"potential to become a paradigm for global rainforest conservation
programs." 2 In 2007, Ecuador became the first nation-state to adopt this
alternative when President Rafael Correa announced his decision not to
exploit the Ishpingo Tambococha Tiputini (ITT) oil fields-one of the
largest in the country that overlaps the Yasuni National Park and
indigenous lands-in exchange for a "fair compensation".3 Ecuador, a
country where a third of the state's resources depend upon the exploitation
of oil, is seeking compensation from the international community for at
least half of the revenue that would have otherwise come from extracting
the oil of the ITT (namely $3.6 billion). Avoided carbon emissions, forest
and biodiversity conservation, and the protection of indigenous peoples are
among the advantages underscored by the proponents of the Yasuni-ITT
Initiative, which is said to "lay the foundations for a more human and fair
civilization."5
. J.D. equivalent (2005), Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru; Master of Laws (LL.M.)
Yale Law School (June 2011); Master of Science (MSc.) in Environmental Change and Management,
University of Oxford (candidate 2012). 1 wish to thank Professor Carol M. Rose (Yale Law School) for
her valuable comments and suggestions to an earlier version of this paper. I also benefited from the
reactions of Jocelyn Stacey, Cecilia O'Neil (Universidad del Pacifico, Lima-Peru), Patty Stockton, Luis
Miguel Velarde, Gabriela Ramirez y Alonso Gurmendi. Finally, I am grateful to Professor Laura Rival
(University of Oxford) for her generous feedback and ideas to the final draft.
1 See Graciela Chichilnisky, Foreword to JOSEPH HENRY VOGEL, THE ECONOMICS OF THE
YASUNi INITIATIVE: CLIMATE CHANGE AS IF THERMODYNAMICS MATTERED, at xii, xvi (2009).
2 Kelly Hearn, Deep in Ecuador's Rainforest, A Plan to Forego an Oil Bonanza, YALE
ENV'T 360 (Sept. 13, 2010), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/deep in-ecuadors-rainforest
a plan to forego anoilbonanza/2315/.
3 See Rafael Correa, President of the Republic of Ecuador, Speech at the 62d Period of
Sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations: High Level Dialogue On Climate Change
(Sept. 24, 2010).
4 Hearn, supra note 2.
s Speech by President Rafael Correa, supra note 3 (emphasis added).
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This paper argues, however, that forgoing a country's oil reserves
though a moratorium will prove to be ineffective climate change policy in
the long-run because it represents a nonenforceable, unilateral promise,
which is subject to the political pendulum. Rather than relying on state-
planned solutions, Amazonian states such as Ecuador should move toward
market-based arrangements that favor carbon sequestration strategies by
preserving forests through "environmental property rights."
Part II provides an overall background on the creation and
boundaries of the Yasuni National Park, the ITT oil reserves, and the
territories of its indigenous peoples. It then describes the main features of
the Yasuni-ITT Initiative based on the agreements entered into between
Ecuador and the United Nations in 2009, which set forth the creation of a
trust fund to channel international contributions to the program.
Part III discusses the reasons supporting Ecuador's claim to the
international community. It also describes different climate-justice theories
that have been offered to justify compensation from the Global North to the
Global South. This paper focuses particularly on the inconsistencies of the
inter-state justice approach that vindicates compensation based on
developed nations' historical emissions and ability to pay, which, to date,
are the underlying justification to main international treaties on climate
change. This paper concludes that Correa's proposal is justifiable from a
cosmopolitan justice standpoint.
Part IV criticizes the Yasuni-ITT Initiative by stressing that a
property-based approach would reduce the likelihood that a post-Correa
government would decide to disregard the oil moratorium in the future.
This critique raises the following arguments: (1) the Initiative's excessive
focus is on the oil and not on the trees, (2) the fact that it does not create
"environmental property rights," (3) the lack of institutional framework
supporting the program, (4) the lack of ripeness of the property rights
regime in Ecuador, and (5) the Initiative's potential to impinge on
indigenous peoples' rights over their ancestral territories.
Finally, Part V proposes three alternatives to President Correa's
model: (1) selling the oil reserves, (2) paying Ecuador for the ecosystem
services that the Yasuni National Park provides, and (3) establishing
conservation easements in the Amazon. This paper concludes that the last
of these alternatives is the most feasible option and should be taken into
account in future climate change policy in Amazonian states.
94 [Vol. 4 No. 1
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II. THE YASUNi-ITT INITIATIVE6
A. General Background
The Yasuni National Park is located in the Amazon Region and is
the largest protected area in Ecuador comprising 982,000 hectares (see
Figure 1). It was created in 1979 and is considered one of the most diverse
areas in the world, In 1989, the Yasuni National Park was declared a
World Biosphere Reserve by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for its unique biodiversity.8 Currently,
the Ministry of Environment of Ecuador, an entity facing a limited budget
' See generally Tracy C. Davis, Breaking Ground Without Lifting a Shovel: Ecuador's Plan
to Leave its Oil in the Ground, 30 Hous. J. INT'L L. 243 (2008) (describing the initiative); Laura Rival,
Ecuador's Yasuni-ITT Initiative: The Old and New Values of Petroleum, 70(2) ECOLOGICAL
ECONOMICS 358 (2010); Matt Finer, Remi Moncel and Clinton N. Jenkins, Leaving the Oil Under the
Amazon: Ecuador's Yasuni-ITT Initiative, 42(1) BIOTROPICA 63 (2010), at 64; Matt Finer, Clinton N.
Jenkins, Stuart L. Pimm, Brian Keane, and Carl Ross, Oil and Gas Projects in the Western Amazon:
Threats to Wilderness, Biodiversity, and Indigenous Peoples, PLOS ONE 3(8) (August 13, 2008)
http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/joumal.pone.0002932; Daniel Gordon, Ecuador Seeks
Oil 'Compensation', BBC NEWS (Sept. 27, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7000345.stm;
Alexandra Valencia, Ecuador, for Pay, Will not Drill in Amazon Reserve, REUTERS (Aug. 3, 2010),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6724S820100803; Alberto Acosta et al., Dejar el Crudo en
Tierra o la Busqueda del Paraiso Perdido (May 12, 2009), available at
http://www.apdh.ec/index.php?option=comjcollection&view-item&id=5%3Adejar-el-crudo-en-tierra-
o-la-busqueda-del-paraiso-&Itemid=77; Alberto Acosta, La Inciativa Yasui-ITT en law Busqueda del
Paraiso Perdido (Feb. 17, 2010), available at http://www.amazoniaporlavida.org/es/files/descargas/ITT-
USFQ.pptx; Alberto Acosta, Professor & Former Minister of Energy & Mines of Ecuador, Conference
at the University of Maryland, Yasuni, Building the Road to the Impossible: Leaving the Crude Oil
Underground (May 23, 2007), available at http://www.amazoniaporlavida.org/es/files/
descargas/presentacionitt acosta_eng.ppt; OILWATCH, KEEP OIL UNDERGROUND THE ONLY WAY TO
FIGHT CLIMATE CHANGE (2007), available at http://www.amazoniaporlavida.org/
es/files/keep oil underground.pdf; SOS YASUNi, http://www.sosYasuni.org/en (last visited Nov. 9,
2011); YASUNi-ITT, http://Yasuni-itt.gob.ec/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2011).
See Hearn, supra note 2, ("An average upland hectare in Yasuni contains 655 species of
trees (more than the United States and Canada combined) and 100,000 species of insects. One section of
the park held at least 200 species of mammals, 247 amphibians and reptile species, and 550 species of
birds, making the park one of the most biodiverse places on Earth."); and Margot S. Bass, Matt Finer,
Clinton N. Jenkins, Holger Kreft, Diego Cisneros-Heredia, Shawn F. McCracken, Nigel C. A. Pitman,
Peter H. English, Kelly Swing, Gorky Villa, Anthony Di Fiore, Christian Voigt, Thomas Kunz, and
Andy Hector, Global Conservation Significance ofEcuador's Yasuni National Park, PLoS ONE (5(1))
at 12 (Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/joumal.pone.0002932.
8 See United Nations Educ., Scientific and Cultural Org. (UNESCO) (Jan. 12, 2011),
http://www.unesco.org/mabdb/br/brdir/directory/biores/asp?code=ECU+02&mode=all; Scientific and
Cultural Org. (Jan. 12, 2011), http://www.unesco.org/mabdb/br/brdir/directory/
biores/asp?code=ECU+02&mode-all; see also Biosphere Reserves - Learning Sites for Sustainable
Development, UNITED NATIONS EDUC. SCI. & CULTURAL ORG., http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-
sciences/environment/ecological-sciences/biosphere-reserves/ (noting that a Biosphere Reserves are
"sites of excellence where new and optimal practices to manage nature and human activities are tested
and demonstrated.").
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and personnel, manages the park.9 The biodiversity value of the Yasuni
National Park is simply priceless.1 o Interestingly, in a region challenged by
climate change-induced
drought, the Yasuni is
expected to maintain wet,
rainforest conditions.'
The park hosts
several indigenous
peoples such as the
Huaorani, Tagaeri and N ews
Taromenane tribes.12
Studies indicate that
almost 10,000 people
13 in..Xinhabit the area. I
1999, the government ' "
declared 780,000 hectares
of the park an "intangible
zone" -an area free of Figure 1
extractive activities- to Source: Oilwatch. 2007
protect the Huaorani
people (see Figure 1).14
Although the government has officially recognized the Huaorani peoples'
right over a portion of this area, specific provisions stipulate this ownership
does not comprise the subsoil, which is state property. 5
The Ecuadorian government has zoned 65% of the Amazon for oil
activities, including the Yasuni National Park.'6 In fact, several oil
companies already operate within the park.'7 Road construction by oil
companies "have facilitated colonization, deforestation, fragmentation, and
overhunting of large fauna in the northwestern section of the park and
illegal logging in the south and west".'8 Petroecuador, the Ecuadorian state-
owned company, currently administers the ITT oil field, which is located in
9 See KEEP OIL UNDERGROUND THE ONLY WAY TO FIGHT CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 7,
at 18.
0 See Rival, supra note 6, at 360.
See Finer, Moncel and Jenkins, supra note 6, at 64.
12 Davis, supra note 6, at 245. See also Rival, supra note 6, at 359.
13 Id.
14 KEEP OIL UNDERGROUND THE ONLY WAY TO FIGHT CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 6, at
19.
" OILWATCH, CONSERVING CRUDE OIL IN THE SUBSOIL 12 (Apr. 12, 2007), available at
http://www.sosYasuni.org/en/files/ow itt proposal v8-ingles.pdf (The Huaorani people are prohibited
from obstructing "mining or hydrocarbon exploration and/or exploitation activities undertaken by the
national government and/or legally authorized individuals or companies").
16 See Finer, Jenkins, Pimm, Keane, and Ross, supra note 6, at 4.
1 See Davis, supra note 6.
i Bass et al, supra note 7, at 2.
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the heart of the park (see Figure 2).19 The oilfield contains 846 million
barrels of heavy crude reserves that represent more than twenty percent of
the total oil reserves of the country.20 Considering the high density of the
crude, the project to exploit the reserves includes a thermoelectric plant, as
well as an oil conversion plant to produce light oil and facilitate
transportation. 21 The crude contained in the ITT fields would produce
107,000 barrels a day,22 which actually represent ten days of world oil
consumption.23 Experts claim that the exploitation of the ITT oil fields will
generate significant negative social and environmental impacts, threatening
the park's wilderness characters and its largely intact mega-faunal
assemblage".24
B. The Initiative
Ecuador announced its decision to give up the ITT oil reserves in
order to put social and environmental values first and to change the energy
matrix of the country.25 In exchange, Ecuador has asked the international
community to compensate the country for at least half of the revenue that
otherwise would have come from extracting the oil, namely $3.6 billion
over a thirteen-year period.26
After arduous domestic and international debate,27 in August 2010,
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the government of
Ecuador agreed on the terms for the establishment of the Yasuni Trust
Fund. The signing of the "Memorandum of Agreement for Management
and Other Support Services Related to the Ecuador Yasuni-ITT Fund,"
'9 See Carlos Larrea, Professor at Universidad Andina Simon Bolivar, Presentation:
Conservation or Oil Extraction in Yasuni National Park? A Transcendental Challenge, available at
http://www.sosYasuni.org/en/index.php?option=com-content&view-article&id=1 11:will-it-be-
conservation-or-oil-extraction-in-the-Yasuninational-park&catid=15:campaign (last visited Nov. 9,
2011).
20 id.
21 Id.
22 id.
23 See Rival, at 361.
24 Bass et al., supra note 7, at 15. See also Dejar el Crudo en Tierra o la Busqueda del
Paraiso Perdido, supra note 6; and Finer, Jenkins, Pimm, Keane, and Ross, supra note 6, at 2.
25 See Ecuador Yasuni-ITT Trust Fund, UNITED NATIONS DEV. GROUP,
http://mdtf.undp.org/Yasunii (last visited Nov. 10, 2011).
26 Hearn, supra note 2; Presentation by Larrea, supra note 16.
27 See generally, Pamela L. Martin, Global Governance from the Amazon: Leaving Oil
Underground in Yasuni National Park, Ecuador, available at
http://www.sosYasuni.org/en/files/global govemancefrom the amazon_pamela martin isa 201 0.pdf
(last visited Nov. 9, 2011) (discussing the social movements, both domestic and international, behind the
elaboration of the Yasuni-ITT initiative),
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dated August 3, 2010 (MOA), and the "Ecuador Yasuni-ITT Fund Terms of
Reference," dated July 28, 2010 (TOR), marked two landmark events in the
history of the Yasuni-ITT Initiative. 28 The UNDP will manage the Yasuni
Fund through a Steering Committee consisting of members of the UNDP
and the government of Ecuador and will receive contributions from a broad
range of donors, including states, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
corporations, and individuals.29 The funds raised will be used to finance
strategic sustainable development programs as stated in the Ecuadorian
national development plan guidelines.30
As a guarantee for keeping the oil in the soil for perpetuity, the
government will issue "Yasuni Guarantee Certificates" (YGCs) in United
States dollars equivalent to the face value of each contribution.3 The YGCs
will also include the metric tons of carbon dioxide avoided according to the
price, at that date, of the European Union Allowances (EUAs) in the
Leipzig Carbon Market.32 They will not earn interest, nor will there be an
expiration or maturity date.33 The maximum total number of YGCs issued
will be equivalent to the value of a total of 407 million metric tons of
34
carbon dioxide not emitted as a result of preserving the ITT oil reserves.
The TOR establishes that the contributions to the Yasuni Fund must
reach a minimum threshold of $100 million by the end of 2011; otherwise,
the contributions will be reimbursed to donors.3 ' The TOR provides that "if
in the future the world carbon market accepts the YGCs as equivalents of
Emission Permits, the Government will issue YGCs for sale to private
and/or public entities in mitigating green house gases (GHGs) through
avoidance of oil and gas extractions from megabiodiverse areas that are
highly socially and environmentally sensitive."36 In the event that the
government defaults on its commitment and decides to initiate oil
prospecting in the Yasuni ITT oil fields, the YGCs will entitle the holders
to be reimbursed by the government.37
The purpose of the proposal is to help abate climate change by
avoiding the release of 407 million tons of carbon dioxide- a consequence
28 See generally Memorandum of Agreement for Management and Other Support Services
Related to the Ecuador Yasuni ITT Fund, Gov't of Ecuador & United Nations Dev. Programme (Aug.
03, 2010), available at http://mdtf.undp.org/document/download/4494 (hereinafter MOA); Terms of
Reference for Ecuador Yasuni ITT Trust Fund, Gov't of Ecuador & United Nations Dev. Programme
(July 28, 2010), available at http://www.pnud.org.ec/Noticias2010/
EcuadorYasunilTTTrustFundTermsofReference.pdf (hereinafter TOR).
29 MOA, supra note 28, at para. 4.
30 Id at para. 7.
3' TOR, supra note 28, at para. 26.
32 id
34 TOR, supra note 28, at para. 28.
3 Id. at para. 30.
36 Id. at para. 37.
3 Id. at para. 29.
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of burning the ITT oil reserves- into the atmosphere. It will also avoid
biodiversity destruction and deforestation, protect fresh water from the
possible oil operations in the area, respect indigenous peoples' rights, and
initiate a post-oil economy by changing the energy matrix of the country.39
To date the regional government of Wallonia (Belgium), and the
governments of Chile, China, and Spain have committed to contribute to
the Yasuni Fund.40 Surprisingly, shortly after the signature of the MOA and
notwithstanding its initial posture fostering President Correa's proposal,4 1
Germany announced that the country would no longer support the Yasuni
Fund.42 In relation to the civil society, the Avina Foundation has also
channeled funds to finance this project.43
III. WHY SHOULD THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY PAY ECUADOR?
President Correa's proposal asks the international community for
compensation to forgo its ITT oil fields. Is there any reason that justifies
such payment, or is Ecuador asking to be compensated for something it is
obliged to do in the first place? This Section addresses these questions.
A. Climate Justice
Climate change has increasingly become an inescapable phenomenon
for everyone, but its effects are especially unavoidable for the poor."
Indeed, poor nations are more vulnerable to climate change than developed
38 Id. at para 5.
3 See id.
40See, e.g., Chile Realiza Primer Aporte a Proyecto Yasuni ITT, EL UNIVERSO (Sept. 15,
2010), http://www.eluniverso.com/2010/09/15/1/1356/chile-realiza-primer-aporte-proyecto-Yasuni-
itt.html; Ecuador Yasuni Capital Window, UNITED NATIONS DEV. GROUP,
http://mdtf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/3EYCO (last visited Nov. 9. 2011); Gobierno Regional de Wallonia
- Bilgica Compromete Contributidn para Inciativa Yasuni-ITT, YASUNi -ITT (Dec. 10, 2010),
http://Yasuni-itt.gob.ec/blog/2010/12/1 0/gobiemo-regional-de-wallonia-belgica-compromete-
contribucion-para-iniciativa-Yasuni-itt/; Mds Instituciones se Unen a la Iniciativa Yasuni ITT, YASUNi-
ITT (Dec. 3, 2010), http://Yasuni-itt.gob.ec/blog/2010/12/03/mas-instituciones-se-unen-a-la-iniciativa-
Yasuni-itt/; and Espana Conreta Contribucian a la Iniciativa Yasuni ITT, YASUNi - ITT (Nov. 11,
2010), http://Yasuni-itt.gob.ec/blog/20 10/11/11/espana-concreta-contribucion-a-la-iniciativa-Yasuni-itt/.
41 See Dejar el Crudo en Tierra o la Busqueda del Paraiso Perdido, supra note 6.
42 See Tasmin Walker & Vinicio Chac6n, Alemania Retira Apoyo a Fondo Ecuatoriano para
no Explotar Petrdleo, DW-WORLD (Sept. 27, 2010) http://www.dw-
world.de/dw/article/0,,6043578,00.html.
43 See, e.g. A VINA Formalizd Entrega de USD 100 Mil para Iniciativa Yasuni ITT (Jan.
2011), http://www.avina.net/esp/10-AVINA-formalizo-entrega-de-USD-100-mil-para-iniciativa-Yasuni-
ITT.note.aspx.
4 PAUL G. HARRIS, WORLD ETHICS AND CLIMATE CHANGE: FROM INTERNATIONAL TO
GLOBAL JUSTICE 35 (20 10).
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ones4 5 and are expected to suffer its consequences disproportionately.46 The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) says that the
consequences of climate change "will fall disproportionately upon
developing countries and poor persons within all countries, and thereby
exacerbate inequities in health status and access to adequate food, clean
water, and other resources."47 In contrast to poor nations, wealthy nations
"have more adaptive capacity [as] a small percentage of their economies
depend on agriculture[,] [which is] a sector highly vulnerable to climate
change. [And] wealthy nations are generally in the cooler, higher latitudes,
which also decreases their vulnerability [to climate change]."48
Thus, climate change is a profound matter of justice, 49 and "raises
questions concerning the distribution of environmental burdens and
benefits" among world nations.50  As Steve Vanderheiden states,
"[a]nthropogenic climate change presents a case of the world's affluent
benefiting at the expense of the world's poor. . . ."' Accordingly, different
climate-justice theories have been put forward to justify the moral
obligation of rich nations of the Global North to help poor nations of the
Global South in climate change relief. This Section summarizes some of
them.
, See id at 25 ("[T]he relationship between climate change-related suffering and poverty is
decidedly direct; as climate change increases, so too does the poverty of poor countries and poor people
46 See STEVE VANDERHEIDEN, ATMOSPHERIC JUSTICE: A POLITICAL THEORY OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 45 (2008). But see Joel B. Smith et al., Vulnerability to Climate Change and Reasons for
Concern: A Synthesis, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 913,
916 (James J. McCarthy et al. eds., 2001) (noting the effects are not uniform in all developing countries)
("The impacts of climate change will not be evenly distributed among the peoples of the world. There is
high confidence that developing countries will be more vulnerable to climate change than developed
countries, and there is medium confidence that climate change would exacerbate income inequalities
between and within countries. There also is medium confidence that a small temperature increase would
have net negative impacts on market sectors in many developing countries and net positive impacts on
market sectors in many developed countries. However, there is high confidence that with medium to
high increases in temperature, net positive impacts would start to decline and eventually would turn
negative, and negative impacts would be exacerbated. Estimates of distributional effects are uncertain
because of aggregation and comparison methods, assumptions about climate variability, adaptation,
levels of development, and other factors.").
4 VANDERHEIDEN, supra note 46, at 81.
48 See Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Global Warming and Social Justice, 31
REGULATIONS 14, 16 (Spring 2008).
49 See HARRIS, supra note 44, at 35.
50See Simon Caney, Human Rights and Global Climate Change, in
COSMOPOLITANISM IN CONTEXT: PERSPECTIVES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICAL THEORY
19, 21-22 (Ronald Pierik & Wouter Werner eds., 2010); and Karen L. O'Brien & Robin M. Leichenko,
Winners and Losers in the Context of Global Change, 93 ANNALS ASS'N AM. GEOGRAPHERS, no. 1,
2003 at 89. ("The effects of [climate] changes are distributed unequally both within and across national
boundaries. Greater inequality in the distribution of the costs and benefits of global change implies that,
while some sectors are integrating smoothly into the global economic system and are capable of
adapting to environmental change, others are becoming marginalized and vulnerable to environmental
change.").
51 VANDERHEIDEN, supra note 46, at 45-46.
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1. The "Polluter Pays" (or Corrective Justice) Approach
This climate-justice account is "based on [historical] causality and
responsibility." 52 It reasons that "those not responsible for causing a
problem should not have to pay to fix it; and, in contrast, those who did
cause the harm are responsible for righting it."53 Corrective justice is
therefore at the heart of this account.54 It requires the developed world -
those nations who have contributed to the problem - "to internalise the
long-term costs of the activities that have caused the enhanced greenhouse
effect."5  In other words, due to "their historical accountability",5 1
developed nations owe remedial action to those nations or citizens most
likely to be harmed by climate change. 57 The president of the Republic of
the Marshall Islands, a country which is located an average of seven feet
above sea level, depicts the "polluter pays" argument the following way:
"The United States is responsible for [twenty-five] percent of all the
[carbon dioxide] emissions in the world. How can it drown my nation and
not do something about that? What gives it the right to do nothing as my
nation goes under?" 8
The corrective justice account presents, however, several
theoretical and practical difficulties. First, estimating the extent of the harm
caused by climate change is immensely difficult due to the existing
scientific uncertainties. 9 Second, identifying the wrongdoers of climate
change seems to be an almost impossible task.60 Even if many citizens of
developed countries benefit from past GHG emissions, it is unclear how
many benefitted and to what extent. What is more, this principle is not
52 HARRIS, supra note 44, at 38.
54 See ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE 100 (2010).
s See EDWARD A. PAGE, CLIMATE CHANGE, JUSTICE AND FUTURE GENERATIONS 167
(2006).
56 See Simon Caney, Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change, 18
Leiden Journal of International Law 747, 753 (2005).
57 See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 48, at 14.
58 JAY INSLEE & BRACKEN HENDRICKS, APOLLO'S FIRE: IGNITING AMERICA'S CLEAN-
ENERGY ECONOMY 5 (2008).
5 Simon Caney, Climate Change and the Duties of the Advantaged, 13 Critical Review of
International Social and Political Philosophy, 203, 206 (2010).
60 See POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 54, at 103.
61 See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 48, at 18 (noting that those responsible for much of the
greenhouse gas effect are now dead and it seems unfair to shoulder their descendants with both the
responsibility for their own environmental behavior and that of their ancestors. "Holding Americans
today responsible for the activities of their ancestors is not a fair or reasonable on corrective justice
grounds because current Americans are not the relevant wrongdoers they are not responsible for the
harm."); see also POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 54, at 108 (noting that many citizens of developed
2011-2012] 101
102 KY J. EQUINE, AGRI., & NAT. RESOURCES L. [Vol. 4 No. I
helpful to address the issue of who is to pay when the polluter is no longer
alive.62 Third, climate change reveals that there is no identity between the
injured victim and the claimant:63 most victims of climate change will live
in the future, and therefore cannot be adequately redressed.64 Fourth, it is
virtually impossible to show that climate change is a direct consequence of
someone else's actions or inactions (e.g., that the GHG emissions in the
United States caused the melting of ice in a village in Alaska.)65 As a matter
of fact, there are a variety of difficulties in attempting to connect an
individual climate-related harm to a particular emitter.66 Fifth, a corrective
justice claim requires intentional, reckless, or negligent action to prosper. 67
But GHG-emitting activities cannot be classified as intentional, reckless, or
negligent until a scientific consensus forms and becomes widely known
among the public. 68 Such consensus did not occur until the 1990s. 69 Finally,
activities that produce GHG emissions have brought many benefits to
current citizens of developing countries, thus indicating the responsibilities
of developed countries should be reduced to account for such benefits. 70 For
all the above, the corrective justice approach seems inadequate to address
climate justice.
countries today are not the direct descendants of GHG-emitting citizens of the past, so it is unclear if
they have actually benefited and to what degree); and Caney, supra note 59, at 211 ("One problem with
the Polluter Pays Principle is that it cannot cope with the effects on the climate that result from the
emissions of earlier generations").
62 See Caney, supra note 56, at 756.
63 See POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 54, at 108.
6 See id
65 See id. at 109; see also David A. Grossman, Tort Based Climate Litigation, in
ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 193, 215
(William C. G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky eds., 2009).
66 See, e.g., POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 54, at 110 ("It is unclear that statistical
relationships can be established with sufficient clarity to support a claim sounding in corrective
justice."); and HARRIS, supra note 44, at 39 (noting that determining which particular affluent country,
and to what extent it caused harm is also a daunting task). But see Douglas Kysar, What Climate Change
Can Do About Tort Law? 1 Envtl. L. 1, 36-37. (Professor Kysar, however, asserts that it is possible to
estimate current and past contributions of a particular emitter. He argues that plaintiffs do not need to
rely on joint and several liability as there are metrics and methods available to standardize the warming
potential of different gases and to quantify a particular defendant's contribution. In this vein, he stresses
that as long as the emissions levels of a particular defendant can be measured, that defendant's
contribution to climate change harm can also be estimated. In regards to historical emissions, plaintiffs
may use other means to undertake such estimations (corporate records, tax filings, government lease
documents, etc.). One study determined that Exxon Mobil is responsible of five percent of carbon
dioxide emissions over the last 120 years).
67 POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 54, at 110.
66 See id; see also Caney, supra note 59, at 208; and Caney, supra note 56, at 762.
69 See PAGE, supra note 55, at 169 (noting that there was "widespread ignorance of the
enhanced greenhouse effect's nature and scale until the 1990s.").
7 Id.
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2. The "Ability to Pay" (or Distributive Justice) Approach
Should "rich nations have a special obligation to deal with climate
change, not because they are principally responsible for the problem, but
simply because they are rich?"n According to the ability to pay approach,
"resources should be redistributed from rich nations and rich people to poor
nations and poor people."72 This account is not focused on who caused
harm, but who can actually rectify it." "[B]y contrast with the Polluter Pays
Principle it is a forward-looking, rather than a backward-looking
principle."74
Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein claim, however, that the distributive
justice approach is problematic because, instead of helping current low-
income people, emission reductions would help poor people in the future.
The authors also maintain that "[p]oor people in poor nations would ...
prefer a cash transfer so they could use the money as they see fit." 76 Lastly,
"many of the beneficiaries of emission reductions are wealthy and many of
the losers from emission reductions are poor."77 Hence the distributive
justice account is also ill suited to attain climate justice.
3. Other Justice Accounts
Some claim that climate justice should rely on the principle of
"intergenerational justice," which states that current generations have a
moral obligation not to undermine the rights of future generations.78 The
principle claims climate change is unjust toward all, "whether those whose
interests are unprotected . . . are currently alive or will be born in the
future."79 In other words, "[p]eople alive at [time 1] are under a duty not to
act in ways which prevent people at [time 1+ 50 years] from being able to
enjoy their rights."80 This requires people in the present "to limit [their]
" POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 54, at 73.
72 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 48, at 14.
73 See Caney, supra note 59, at 213.
74 d
7 1 Id. at 17.
76 Id. at 17; see also POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 54, at 74 ("The rich indeed have an
obligation to help the poor, they should fulfill this obligation in the best possible way, whether this
involves cash grants, development aids, trade rules or other mechanisms.").
7 Posner & Sustein, supra note 48, at 17.
7 See Caney, supra note 50, at 30.
7 1 Id. at 21.
'
0 Id. at 33.
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overall GHG emissions, accepting some costs now for [future generations']
benefit[s] later."8'
Other postures contend that trees should have legal standing.82
Christopher D. Stone argues, "we should have a system in which, when a
friend of a natural object perceives it to be endangered, he can apply to a
court for the creation of a guardianship."" Under this scheme, paying
Ecuador would be a way to respect nature's rights. Here it is interesting to
note that the 2008 Ecuador Constitution recognizes nature as a subject of
law and not as a mere object of law.84
To conclude, human rights doctrines could be invoked to justify the
Yasuni-ITT Initiative. On one hand, it allegedly purports to protect
indigenous peoples living in the national park from the negative impacts of
oil exploitation. Several international instruments, such as the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, have emerged to
restrict a state's sovereignty in the treatment of the indigenous populations
that inhabit its territory. By the same token, other treaties that were not
originally designed to protect indigenous peoples have been accommodated
to embrace their rights.86 On the other, climate change jeopardizes the
human right to life, health, and subsistence of all individuals, hence the
need to mitigate GHG emissions, and the Yasuni Initiative seems to be an
option for it.
8' VANDERHELDEN, supra note 46, at 121.82 See generally CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? TOWARD LEGAL
RIGHTS FOR NATURAL OBJECTS (1972).
83 Id. at 17.
84 CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 20, 2008, art. 83(6)
("Ecuadorians have the following dut[y] . . . To respect the rights of nature, preserve a healthy
environment and use natural resources rationally, sustainably[,] and durably.").
8' See Patrick Macklem, Indigenous Recognition in International Law: Theoretical
Observations, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 177, 187 (2008) ("Although international law excludes indigenous
peoples from its distribution of sovereign authority and renders them subject to the sovereign power of
the States in which they live, international law [] purports to protect indigenous peoples from the
exercise of sovereign power.").
86 See, e.g., MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON
THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE (Claire Charters & Rodolfo Stavenhagen eds., 2009); S. James
Anaya & Robert A. Williams, The Protection of Indigenous Peoples' Rights Over Lands and Natural
Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System, 14 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 33 (2001); and Jo
M. Pasqualucci, International Indigenous Land Rights: A Critique of the Jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in Light of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, 27 WIS. INT'L L.J. 51 (2009).
87 SIMON CANEY, CLIMATE CHANGE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND MORAL THRESHOLDS IN
GARDNER ET AL. (ED), CLIMATE ETHICS (Oxford University Press, 2010).
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B. Inter-state or International Justice
The causes and consequences of climate change are global.88 For this
reason, collective international action is critical to formulate an effective
response on the scale required.89 Many efforts in the international field have
been expended toward addressing climate change.90 A number of the
provisions of these international environmental agreements reflect the
climate-justice accounts described in Section III.
For example, the principle of "common but differentiated
responsibility" is present in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development.91 "According to this principle, while all states are responsible
for global environmental problems, some are more responsible than others,"
both for their past contributions and their abilities to pay.92 On the other
hand, the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) acknowledges that while all states should be part of efforts to
limit emissions of GHGs, developed states "would take the lead to help the
world's poor countries address both the causes and consequences of climate
change.93 Furthermore, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol also reflects this principle,
88 Nicolas Stem, Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTINDONESIA/Resources/226271-1170911056314/3428109-
l 174614780539/SternReviewEng.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2011).
89 Id.
90Id
91 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janerio, Braz., June
3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. DOc.A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1
(Vol.1), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) ("States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve,
protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the different
contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated
responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the
international pursuit to sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the
global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command.").
92 HARRIS, supra note 44, at 80.
9 Id.; see also United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art.3, May 9,
1992, S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 ("1. The Parties should protect the climate
system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.
Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the
adverse effects thereof."); and VANDERHEIDEN, supra note 46, at 56 ("The UNFCCC contains no
binding commitments, and signatory nations agreed only to a nonbinding pledge to freeze GHG
emissions at 1990 levels pending further study, but its symbolic importance in recognizing the
importance of the issue and in initiating international political action to address climate change cannot
be overstated. Additionally, the treaty set most of the normative ideals that continue to guide
development and evaluation of the fairness of ongoing climate policy negotiations and development. Its
declared commitment to equity in both its process and substantive policy outputs, though subsequent
agreements display significant deficits in both of these regards, nonetheless remains the foundational
ideal of climate policy development, and its normative language continues to serve as the basis for
efforts to design a climate regime that realizes these goals.").
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as it does not require developing countries to engage in emission reduction
commitments in the assumption that the main wrongdoers are developed
countries listed in Annex 1 of the treaty. 94
Many authors argue, however, that international environmental law
treaties fail to address binding GHG emissions cuts.95 The main critique is
that the Kyoto Protocol neglects to call on the main emitters of the world,
especially the United States,96 which claims the treaty is unfair.97 In
addition, countries such as Brazil, China, or India have not undertaken any
compromise to reduce their GHG emissions, as they are not listed in Annex
1 of the treaty.98 The consequence is that, without engaging the world's
most polluting nations, these treaties prove to be inefficient mechanisms to
mitigate GHG emissions. It is worth noting that the United States has
conditioned its participation on future carbon cuts on China's engagement
in similar obligations.99 Conversely, China insists that developed countries,
such as the United States, "move first and do more" in the light of their past
contributions.100 The result has been procrastination in the international
fora, evidencing that the climate change regime is characterized by
"diplomatic delay, minimal action . .. and mutual blame."o
Some attribute that the lack of scientific consensus regarding the
causes and consequences of climate change as a factor that has slowed
down the process of reaching a worldwide comprehensive solution:
[T]he politicization of science by industry opponents of
global climate policy efforts, together with sympathetic
representatives in government, has stymied the
development of fair and effective climate policy through a
coordinated public relations and lobbying campaign
94See HARRIS, supra note 44, at 82.
9 Paul G. Harris, Introduction: Cosmopolitanism and Climate Change Policy, in, ETHICS
AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: COSMOPOLITAN CONCEPTIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE I (Paul
G. Harris ed., 2011).
9 See VANDERHEIDEN, supra note 46, at 15-16 (noting that for many "the U.S. government
remains the primary obstacle blocking the empowerment of an effective global climate regime.").
97 See id at 64 (statement of U.S. President George W. Bush and his reason for the United
States withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, "I oppose the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts 80
percent of the world, including major population centers such as China and India, from compliance, and
would cause serious harm to the U.S. economy. The Senate's vote, 95-0, shows that there is a clear
consensus that the Kyoto Protocol is an unfair and ineffective means of addressing global climate
change concerns.").
98See id at 14 ("Not included within the initial round of binding emissions reductions were
mandatory emissions caps for the world's developing nations, including China, India, and Brazil . . . .").
99 See Karin Mickelson, Beyond a Politics of the Possible? South-North Relations and
Climate Justice, 10 MELBOURNE J. INT'L L., no. 2, 2009 at 411, 416 ("The US [should] forge ahead on
climate change initiatives, even in the absence of corresponding Chinese commitment. . . . [S]etting a
positive example is the best option to encourage China to move forward as well.").
100 See id
'1 HARRIS, supra note 44, at 40.
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designed to undermine the scientific basis of climate
change, and thereby to convince the public that no
mandatory action is needed. 102
Others argue that the North-South dichotomy underlying international
justice is inadequate. For Karin Michelson, countries such as Brazil, India,
and China should no longer be considered "developing nations,"
emphasizing that the vulnerability to climate change cannot be defined in
geographic terms ("North" or "South"), as evidenced by Hurricane Katrina
and indigenous peoples' suffering in the far North. 03 Furthermore, Posner
and Sunstein assert that the reliance on distributive and corrective justice
"muddy the picture and threaten to interfere with efforts to negotiate an
effective climate treaty in the future."l0 4
Overall, international environmental treaties like the UNFCCC or
Kyoto Protocol have gone wrong due to their inter-state approach to solve a
global problem. According to John Vogler, these treaties are "interstate
institutions attempting to superintend what are often global problems ....
[although] nation states remain legally pre-eminent in the world system ..
they cannot be expected to rise above their own short-term national and
electoral concerns."' 0 5 The problem with the inter-state approach is that it
diverts all responsibilities to states, excluding individuals and institutions.
As Paul G. Harris maintains, international justice has failed to discourage
consumption and pollution by the rise of millions of new consumers,
whether in the North or South.' 06 As China develops, millions of Chinese
citizens become affluent and gain access to a vast number of GHG polluting
goods. 107 Yet, these new emerging classes in developing countries are not
102 VANDERHEIDEN, supra note 46, at 44.
'0 Mickelson, supra note 99, at 416-17.
104 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 48, at 20.
105 JOHN VOGLER, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: ENVIRONMENTAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL
GOvERNANCE 215-16 (2d ed. 2000) (In contrast, others have identified certain global features in
international environmental instruments, though still ruled by international justice rather than global
justice); see, e.g. COSMOPOLITANISM IN CONTEXT: PERSPECTIVES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 46, at 6 (noting that increasingly, international law has incorporated
notions such as "the common bonds" and the "shared heritage" of all peoples, the idea of human dignity,
or the notion that environmental protection is a common concern of humankind. Of course, this is not to
say that all international institutions and regimes are now founded upon cosmopolitan principles or
moving progressively towards ideals of global justice).
1'0 Paul G. Harris, Climate Change and the Impotence of International Environmental Law:
Seeking a Cosmopolitan Cure, 16 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV., no. 2, Winter 2008, at 323, 326.
'0' Id. See INSLEE & HENDRICKS, supra note 53, at 15 (arguing that the number of vehicles in
China has more than doubled between 2000 and 2006, and still there is a huge gap to fill because China
has 10 cars for every 1,000 people, whereas the United States has 500 cars for every 1,000 people).
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obligated to reduce their GHG footprint, becoming the new "free riders" of
air pollution. 08
The previous paragraphs show that inter-state justice is neither
willing nor attuned to the requirements of a global battle against climate
change.' 09 Instead of thinking of the global environmental problem as
involving exclusively the duties of justice among states, "we should ...
think of it as one that [also] involves actions and responsibilities among
individuals and institutions."'o Consequently, an alternative solution to the
inter-state doctrine is needed,"' and that alternative is cosmopolitanism.
C. Cosmopolitan Justice
"Climate change cries out for a cosmopolitan response. It is a
global problem with global causes and consequences," and should be
addressed from a global perspective; not from an international or inter-state
one.112 Harris states, "[o]ur future requires that our responses to the
globalization of environmental changes and their consequences include a
globalization of justice."ll 3 This Section illustrates why cosmopolitan
justice serves to justify the compensation envisaged by Ecuadorians.
International justice views national borders as being the basis for
justice.11 From this perspective, "states have very few duties of justice
towards one another, and even less . . . towards people living in other
states.""' But as national borders lose their significance, it seems each time
more incoherent to insist on their traditional role as a moral limit." 6 This is
why, in contrast to inter-state justice, cosmopolitan justice asserts that "the
ethical obligations and responsibilities are not defined or delineated by
national borders."ll 7 Hence, for the cosmopolitans "it makes no difference
1os See Harris, supra note 95, at 344 (noting that "[w]hen there were relatively few affluent
people in the developing world . . . we could overlook their impact on climate change and let them 'free
ride' on the limited obligations of their states, much as the rich have always been free riders.").
109 See id at 333.
11o HARRIS, supra note 44, at 111.
.. See id at 94.
"
2 See id at 118.
113 Id. at 184.
114 See Harris, supra note 95, at 335; and Thomas Pogge, ( Que es la Justicia Global? 9
(2007), http://www.flacsoandes.org/web/imagesFTP/1269876752.Quees_1a Justicia Global.pdf.
" HARRIS, supra note 44, at 56 ("[T]he interstate system under which we live today is one
based on communitarian principles, often in extreme. This Westphalian world view [] is one premised
on a particular kind of communitarianism, which asserts that people's identities and their moral values
arise not from some common humanity or universal values, but rather from shared traditions within
established communities .... "). See also SHARON ANDERSON-GOLD, COSMOPOLITANISM AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 1 (2001); see also HARRIS, supra note 44, at 29-30.
116 See Pogge, supra note 114, at 5-6.
"1 Id. See also Edward Page, Cosmopolitanism, climate change, and greenhouse emissions
trading, International Theory (2011), 3:1, 37-69, at 44.
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whether a person lives here or there, provided that, wherever he lives, he
lives a citizen of the world.""'
Moral cosmopolitans claim that all "citizens of the world share a
membership in one single community" - the world as a whole." 9 Under
this account, individuals develop "multiple loyalties not only to one's own
state but also to other human beings living far away." 20 Therefore, every
person has moral duties toward all human beings since every human being
is the ultimate unit of moral concern.121 This is because human beings are
all inextricably interconnected to the extent that "a violation of rights in one
part of the world is felt everywhere."l22 In short, under the cosmopolitan
regime, a global citizen's allegiance is to the community of human beings
in the entire world.123
Cosmopolitanism, though universalizing and totalizing, does not
reject the idea that solutions to climate change involve states.124 While
recognizing the role of states in climate change abatement,
cosmopolitanism does not "absolve capable [affluent] individuals from
explicit responsibility and obligation; nor should it prevent diplomats,
activists and scholars, along with laypersons, from discussing it and
attempting to implement it personally." 25 Cosmopolitanism "can locate
[the] . . . obligation to act on climate change, and to aid those people who
are suffering from it, in capable individuals in both affluent and poor
states." 26
In light of the above, the cosmopolitan justice account can serve to
justify Ecuador's call for global citizens to contribute to the Yasuni Fund.
Ecuador's proposal stems from the idea that national borders are not an
adequate basis for climate change justice. So, if borders do not matter, the
solutions should involve transnational solidarity among world citizens, and
not states alone. Further, cosmopolitanism requires citizens to take actions
personally because "[e]veryone has a basic right not to be harmed by the
pollution of others, whether they be next door or on the other side of the
11 ANDERSON-GOLD, supra note 115, at 1 (quoting Marcus Aurelius, an ancient Roman
cosmopolitan).
119 COSMOPOLITANISM IN CONTEXT: PERSPECTIVES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 46, at 1.
120 HARRIS, supra note 44, at 31.
121 See id See also Page, supra note 117, at 44.
122 GARRET WALLACE BROWN, GROUNDING COSMOPOLITANISM: FROM KANT TO THE IDEA
OF A COSMOPOLITAN CONSTITUTION 1 (2009).
123 See id. at 2.
124 See Harris supra note 95, at 335 and 343.
125 HARRIS, supra note 44, at ix.
126 Harris, supra note 95, at 324.
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planet."1 27 In this line, the Yasuni-ITT Initiative calls for the contribution
not only of state parties but also of a multiplicity of global actors, including
private and public entities, NGOs, and individuals. That is to say, it
purports to mobilize global citizens, regardless of their national
commitments and allegiances by invoking universal values. 128
Ecuador's proposal implies that the world's affluent people - and
not only those from the North - have a moral duty to confront the negative
effects of climate change toward all human beings. This is why the
initiative goes beyond the North-South dichotomy, which has traditionally
brought about mutual blame and delay in climate change negotiations.
Conversely, the protagonists of the cosmopolitan regime purported by
President Correa are not only states but also affluent individuals and
institutions that are able to engage in carbon offsetting markets.129
Moreover, this program strongly acknowledges the urge of taking
immediate action and not waiting for the outcome of lethargic and virtually
immobile international negotiations, as states attempt to reach a new post-
Kyoto framework. The initiative is therefore attuned to the current and
compelling exigencies of mitigating GHG emissions without further delay.
All told, the cosmopolitan standpoint, which is inherent in the
Yasuni-ITT Initiative, provides a better road map (or at least a subsidiary
one) than the inter-state doctrine for dealing with climate justice.o30 It is a
measure to reinforce human solidarity in a divided world.' 3  Even so, it
faces important challenges in a world still characterized by the lack of
institutional cosmopolitan networks beyond state level.132 Indeed, how are
cosmopolitan obligations supposed to be set, enforced, and by whom in the
absence of a "democratic global government?" 33
1 Id. at 338.
28 See HARRIS, supra note 44, at vii.
129 Page, supra note 117, at 45 ("It could, in fact, be argued that emissions trading is
inherently cosmopolitan in envisaging a universal community of emissions allowance sellers and buyers
whose autonomous valuations determine how the global emissions cap is to be distributed").
30 See id at 73.
131 Laura Rival, The Yasuni-ITT Initiative: Oil Development and alternative forms of wealth
making in the Ecuadorian Amazon, Conference organized by the Smith School of Enterprise and the
Environment, University of Oxford, November 29, 2011.
132 See Luis Cabrera, The Cosmopolitan Imperative: Global Justice through Accountable
Integration, 9 J. ETHICS 1/2 171, 173 (2005); and Harris, supra note 95, at 8.
1n Luis CABRERA, POLITICAL THEORY OF GLOBAL JUSTICE: A COSMOPOLITAN CASE FOR
THE WORLD STATE 2 (2004) ("Full acknowledgment of the demands of moral cosmopolitanism also
should commit us to strong institutional cosmopolitanism, specifically, to the creation of a network of
strong democratic institutions above the state. The fully integrated institutional form would be a
democratic global government capable of ensuring that any person born anywhere can lead a decent
life").
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The cosmopolitan regime relies primarily on voluntary efforts of
global citizens to take action regardless of borders. 134 All affluent human
beings are summoned, whether domiciled in the Global North or Global
South, whether the beneficiary of past GHG emissions or not. Yet, in the
absence of cosmopolitan institutions,'13  cosmopolitan obligations are
unenforceable. Therefore, contributions from affluent citizens are seen as
voluntary measures of those taking responsibility for their own GHG
emissions, off-setting their individual carbon footprints, and avoiding
perpetuating themselves as climate change free-riders.
In addition, the cosmopolitan regime would require a definition or
threshold for "affluence" to allocate responsibilities thoroughly. Certainly,
"the better placed an individual is to do what is right, the greater the onus
on him to do what is right".'36 Yet, an affluence criterion may be difficult to
determine, as it varies from polity to polity. Although this point is beyond
the scope of this paper, it is clear that cosmopolitanism can seriously
materialize in concrete measures that favor carbon offsetting to be
undertaken by capable global citizens.
D. Is Ecuador Asking for Compensation to do Something it is Obliged to
do?
Here, this article will briefly address the skeptical question of
whether Ecuador is, in actuality, driven by conservationist goals, or if it is
asking to be compensated for something it is obliged to do in the first place.
Considering that the Yasuni National Park was created in 1979, one
could legitimately expect it to be already immune to oil development
projects. 137 Yet, since its creation, successive Ecuadorian governments have
continued to promote oil development in the park.138 Why should the
international community pay for Ecuador's contradictory policies? The
truth is that "President Correa's offer [is] a crucial turning point in the long-
134 See Cabrera, supra note 132, at 172 (noting "[m]oral cosmopolitans tend to focus on the
duties of individuals to make charitable donations, or on the obligations of states to make larger
voluntary transfers within the existing system.").
135 See id. at 175 (noting that "institutional cosmopolitanism advocates the restructuring of
the global system to bring states under the authority of just supranational institutions, including possibly
the institutions of a global government, to ensure that cosmopolitan distributional obligations will be
fulfilled.").
136 Harris, supra note 95, at 6, citing James Garvey.
137 See Finer, Moncel and Jenkins, supra note 6, at 64-65.
138 See id
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standing drive to drill in Yasuni".139 This is why it deserves international
attention.
Ecuador is a signatory of different environmental treaties aimed at
the protection of the Amazon's biological diversity. Does this mean that
Ecuador is asking for money to fulfill its international obligations? The
answer is likely "no" as Ecuador's international commitments do not
compel it to forgo its oil reserves, even when dealing with sensitive areas
such as the Amazon. The decision whether to exploit its natural resources is
still a sovereign prerogative.
The exploitation of the ITT oil fields appears to be complex and
extremely expensive. On the one hand, the high permeability of the subsoil
would prevent the full recovery of heavy crude.140 On the other, due to the
poor quality of the oil, Ecuador would need to construct a thermoelectric
power plant and a pipeline to move the oil from the Amazon to the coast.
Skeptics will say, in turn, that Ecuador is seeking compensation as it has
realized the unfeasibility of its oil exploitation project. Yet, as complicated
as it may be, it seems that the exploitation of natural resources is still
viable. In fact, different oil companies already operate in other blocks
located in the Yasuni National Park, including Brazil's Petrobras, Canada's
EnCana, and Spain's and Argentina's Repsol-YPF.141 In other words,
technicalities are not an impediment for the ITT oil project.
Additionally, in 2006 the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR) granted precautionary measures in favor of the Tagaeri
and Taromenami indigenous peoples who inhabit the Ecuadorian Amazon
jungle.142 As a result of this, the IACHR requested that the Ecuadorian
government adopt the measures to protect the land inhabited by these
indigenous peoples.143 Skeptics will contend that Ecuador is obligated to
protect the indigenous peoples by refraining from exploiting its oil reserves.
However, the IACHR pronouncement is not only a non-binding
recommendation,'" but also does not prevent Ecuador from exploiting its
oil reserves within the territories of indigenous peoples. In this regard, the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights has ruled that the rights of
indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and resources does not prevent
the state from granting concessions for the exploration and extraction of
139 id.
140 See Rival, supra note 6, at 360.
141 Davis, supra note 6, at 248.
142 INTER-AMERICAN COMM'N OF HUMAN RIGHTS, PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES 2006,
available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/medidas/2006.eng.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011) ("The
information available states that members of the Taromenami tribe were murdered during reprisals
linked to illegal tree felling in the Yasuni Park and encroachments onto indigenous lands.. .
143 id.
144 See, e.g., Caballero-Delgado & Santana v. Colombia, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
67 (Dec. 8, 1995); and Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 80 (Sept. 17,
1997).
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natural resources within indigenous territories when certain conditions are
met. 14 5 In other words, if Ecuador undertakes the consultation processes
with native peoples and guarantees their rights, the eventual oil exploitation
of the ITT oil fields would vest legally.
In light of the above, Ecuador's proposal is not a countermeasure to
the impossibility of exploiting oil reserves due to environmental and human
rights obligations, nor to avoid complex expenditures needed to access oil
reserves.
IV. THE CRITIQUE
The academic literature on the Ecuadorian proposal is devoted to
praising President Correa's model for its "revolutionary and visionary
approach."1 4 6 For example, Tracy C. Davis underscores the potential of the
program "to shift the existing environmental and development
paradigms."l47 Leaving the oil underground, she argues, is "striking in its
scope and creativity."1 48 Laura Rival stresses that this is a "highly creative
challenge from the part of a small developing country heavily dependent on
oil to the chaotic international order emerging out of the Kyoto
Protocol." 4 9 In the same way, Graciela Chichilnisky considers the initiative
to be "an innovative response from Latin America to the procrastination of
the global negotiations" for a post-Kyoto framework.5 o Chichilnkisky
elaborates further by affirming that the world "should compensate those
who produce a positive externality and charge those who produce the
negative externality. This is what the carbon market does. This is what, in a
different way, the Yasuni-ITT initiative attempts to do. . . . Yasuni is the
new economics of plant Earth."' Similarly, Pamela L. Martin contends the
Initiative is "a lesson for academics and policymakers ... who are seeking
innovative solutions to protect [the environment]."l52 Furthermore, Alberto
Costa underlines the importance of the project as a way to promote the
transformation of Ecuador's economic model currently based on the
145 See Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 125-28 (Nov. 28, 2007).
146 See Finer, Moncel and Jenkins, supra note 6, at 63.
147 Davis, supra note 6, at 243.
148 Id. at 258.
149 Rival, supra note 6, at 362.
15o Chichilnisky, supra note 1, at xv.
1s' Id. at xvii-xviii.
152 Martin, supra note 27, at 2.
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exploitation of natural resources.' As this Section will explain, my vision
is less enthusiastic.
How truly innovative is Ecuador's scheme? The Yasuni-ITT
Initiative originates from a well-known legal institution-the
154---
moratorium. Moratoriums are "a suspension of activit[ies] or an
authorized period of delay," and are determined by a governmental
authority for numerous reasons. 15  Moratoriums are found at all levels of
government in all manner of activities, from federal offshore oil leases, to a
country's moratorium on landfills or building permits.156 President Correa's
initiative seeks to establish an oil moratorium in the ITT fields, overlapping
the Yasuni National Park, for an unlimited period of time. 57 It is founded
on the belief, shared by many, that leaving oil reserves unexploited through
state regulation -not the market- is an effective way of tackling climate
change.5 8
Yet the very idea of approving an oil moratorium, in general, and in
the Amazonian region of Ecuador, in particular, is not a new idea.159 The
novelty of the model relies, though, on two facts. First, the moratorium is
intended to be perpetual; and second, Ecuador is conditioning its issuance
to a minimum threshold of contributions to the Yasuni Fund. Hence the
message goes as follows: if the international community and the
cosmopolitan citizens of the world want Ecuador to keep the oil in the soil
for perpetuity, and thus avoid the release of millions of tons of carbon
" KEEP OIL UNDERGROUND THE ONLY WAY TO FIGHT CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 6, at
7.
154 7 WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 116-17 (2d ed.).
155 id.
156 See id.
15 KEEP OIL UNDERGROUND THE ONLY WAY TO FIGHT CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 6, at
65 (noting "[I[n the Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputini field in the Yasuni National Park, about 920 million
barrels of heavy oil would remain in the ground in perpetuity or in a moratorium sine die. . . .").
"8 See id. Finer, Moncel and Jenkins, supra note 6, at 63 ("[F]orgoing extraction of oil and
gas reserves in remote or sensitive places could be an important piece to a larger global strategy
designed to limit carbon emissions"); Gary Bridge, Past Peak Oil, in GLOBAL POLITICAL ECOLOGY
(Richard Peet, Paul Robbins, and Michael Watts eds., 2010) ("Contra the claims of peak oil, the
problem is not one of trying to get more oil (or coal or gas) out of the ground, but of finding ways to
keep it shut in); and POLLY HIGGINS, ERADICATING ECOCIDF: LAWS AND GOVERNANCE TO PREVENT
THE DESTRUCTION OF OUR PLANET (2010) at X1 ([T]ackling the problem at the root is referred to as
turning off the 'upstream', closing off the source. This means stopping the processes that extract and
deplete the natural capital in its raw state. Do that and the downstream operations that are dependent on
the life-force of the upstream operations shudder to a halt").
1s9 See Martin, supra note 27, at 28 ("[Llearning from the previous campaign surrounding the
Chevron Texaco case and others in the Southern Amazon, such as Sarayacu, activists, researchers, and
scholars began calling for a moratorium on oil drilling in this region in the mid-1990s. In 2000, Alberto
Acosta and Acci6n Ecol6gica.... called for a moratorium on oil extraction in the Amazon and a move
toward alternative energy sources for the country. This laid the groundwork for a larger plan that
included opposition to global climate change, support for those portions of the developing world not
included in the Kyoto Protocol, and protection for the rainforest and for those uncontacted peoples
living within it.") (internal citations omitted).
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dioxide that would otherwise be burned and pollute the atmosphere, they
must pay for it.16 0
This Section analyzes to what extent the Yasuni-ITT Initiative
represents an adequate framework to abate climate change.
A. The Focus on the Oil and not on the Trees
Ecuador requires as compensation half the opportunity cost of
exploiting the ITT oil reserves. The calculation for the envisaged payment
is not based on how much carbon dioxide the Amazonian rainforest will
absorb or avoid if preserved, or on the unique value of the biodiversity it
hosts, but on the market value of the oil reserves. 16' For this reason, the
Yasuni-ITT Initiative places the economic incentives in the wrong place: it
is primarily structured around the oil, instead of making Ecuador preserve
its rainforests from land use transformation.
Ecuador is asking to be compensated for not doing something (that
is, not exploiting oil reserves) rather than for doing something (that is,
preserving the forest areas and biodiversity). While a conservationist
approach would require affirmative obligations from Ecuador, forgoing the
oil reserves simply implies passivity or inaction. This is why some consider
this initiative as a "funding capture" or "begging for subsidies instead of
living from one's honest productive work." 62 As put by Sebastian Lesch,
spokesman of the German Ministry of Economic and Development
Cooperation, in direct reference to the Yasuni-ITT Initiative, "[o]ur
objective is to promote active policies in active countries, in lieu of paying
them for not doing anything.'' 3
Like the German officials, others have criticized the exaggerated
emphasis that the initiative places on the oil payment'6 4 and have
questioned whether the funds obtained will be adequately channeled to
160 See VOGEL, supra note 1, at 78 ("The Yasuni-ITT Initiative rests on the realpolitik that
poor carbon-rich countries will extract their fuel reserves if not paid to do otherwise.").
161 See Orlando Perez, Correa Propone que le Compren "Petrdleo Simbdlico ", TERRA MAG.
(Oct. 15, 2007), http://www.ar.terra.com/terramagazine/interna/0,,EI8864-OIl 988252,00.html
(claiming that the type of arrangement developed by Ecuador is a compensation for keeping the oil in
the subsoil).
162 See Rival, supra note 6, at 363.
163 Walker & Chac6n, supra note 42.
'64 See Dejar el Crudo en Tierra o la Busqueda del Paraiso Perdido, supra note 6 ("Recent
debate has focused on the need to compensate Ecuador for the oil moratorium. . . . The preservation of
the ITT is important by itself, regardless of the state of mind and willingness to pay of the international
community. The demand for international compensation cannot be used as an excuse to justify inaction.
It shall be viewed as an opportunity to act national and internationally.") (author's translation).
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protect indigenous peoples and preserve biodiversity, as purported. 6 5 1In
this regard, the threshold of $100 million to be raised before December
2011,166 as stipulated in the MOA, is a clear manifestation of the excessive
weight given to the economic aspect of the proposal by Ecuadorian
authorities. Some may argue that the economic emphasis, and especially the
"deadline" established by Ecuador, is a deal breaker.
But why did Ecuador structure its initiative around the oil and not
the trees? Ecuador might have perceived that by focusing on the oil it
would maximize its cut. Indeed, an important factor to bear in mind is that
the calculations of how many oil barrels are stored in the subsurface of the
park - a complex task in itselfl 67 - are already available thanks to oil
prospecting, whereas the calculations of how much carbon can be absorbed
are not only unavailable, but hard to determine (see infra Section V). The
focus on the oil is not only the weakest point of the whole project, but also
may result in a deterrent to future international cooperation as Germany's
reaction evidences.
B. YGCs are not "Environmental Property Rights"
The atmosphere is a "global commons," - a resource that does not
or cannot fall under sovereign jurisdiction of a particular state because of
the physical impossibility of extending such control. 168 Global commons
are open to all and "free for the taking."l 69 They can be used by all states
and their nationals for resource extraction or waste disposal.170 Considering
human's self-interested nature, it is generally believed that users will
deplete the commons if left unregulated or unowned.171 As no users of the
commons can exclude another individual from a resource,17 2  this
165 See id ("Economic compensation does not necessarily assure that it is directly connected
to local communities or to the restoration of environmentally degraded areas. . . . In other words, even
though we can obtain large amounts of monies from international sources, this will not result in
effective social and environmental policies for the Amazon region.").
166 TOR, supra note 28, para. 30.
167 See Elinor Ostrom et. al., Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges,
284 Sa. 278, 278 (1999) ("Resources that are intrinsically difficult to measure or that require
measurement with advanced technology, such as stocks of ocean fishes or petroleum reserves, are
difficult to manage no matter what the scale of the resource.").
68 See, e.g., VOGLER, supra note 105, at 4; and Robert DeLay, Our Post-Kyoto Treaty
Climate Change Framework: Open Market Carbon-Ranching as Smart Development, 7 PENN ST.
ENVTL. L. REV. 55, 67 (2008).
169 VOGLER, supra note 105.
"o See Christopher Joyner, Global Commons: The Oceans, Antarctica, the Atmosphere, and
Outer Space, in MANAGING GLOBAL ISSUES: LESSONS LEARNED 354, 361 (P.J. Simmons & Chantar de
Jonge Oudraat eds., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2001) (noting that the atmosphere acts
like a "common sink" by absorbing GHG from human activities).
"7 See Anthony Russomanno, The Ethics of Heat: Fundamentals and Challenges in
Allocating the Global Commons, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 551, 571 (2009).
172 Carol Rose, Property Rights, Development Imperatives, and Environmental Protection
(Mar. 2008), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/sela/Rose.pdf.
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characteristic encourages overuse and discourages investment. As a result,
"all [users] become free riders, taking as much as they can and investing
nothing, and turning otherwise renewable resources into wasting assets." 73
This is why "determining who has access to common resources, and to
what extent, is at the heart" of Garret Hardin's "tragedy of the
commons." 74
Air pollution exemplifies this tragedy. Given that the atmosphere
cannot be fenced or parceled into shares,"' "individuals, companies, and
states . . . [will tend] to "free-ride" by letting others take on the costs of
mitigat[ing]"' 7 6 the impacts of their pollution (in the form of carbon
emissions) "while they continue to enjoy the benefits of those activities...
."177 In consequence, they impose the external costs of their activities on
society in the form of reduced air quality and disruption of global climate
regulation services.178 As noted by Posner and Weisbach, "[w]henever
people engage in activities that emit carbon . . . they deplete the resource
but do not pay a price for the harm they impose on others."l 79
Furthermore, the atmosphere can absorb just a limited amount of
carbon dioxide.180 Since 1750, global atmospheric concentrations of carbon
dioxide and other GHG have increased exponentially and now exceed by
far the atmospheric concentrations prior to industrialization. 8 ' Global
warming is therefore the result of the atmosphere reaching its carrying
capacity to absorb GHG.182 The global dimensions of the tragedy are
173 id.
174 Joyner, supra note 151, at 356-57 (on the "tragedy of the commons,"); see generally
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy ofthe Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING
THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); THE DRAMA OF
THE COMMONS (2001); Thrainn Eggertsson, Open Access Versus Common Property, in PROPERTY
RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT AND LAW 73 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003);
and Louis De Alessi, Private Property Rights as the Basis for Free Market Environmentalism, in WHO
OwNs THE ENVIRONMENT? 29 (Peter Hill & Roger Meiners eds., 1998).
175 Hardin, supra note 152, at 1245.
176 HARRIS, supra note 44, at 91.
177 Id.; see also INSLEE & HENDRICKS, supra note 53, at 34-35 ("Every ton of coal and every
gallon of gas we use send [carbon dioxide] into our atmosphere, gratis, with absolutely no tribute, no
cost, no payment of any kind. We can no longer afford this luxury. It will only be through smart policies
that we rein these 'external' costs that have been passed on to us all. . . . The principle of 'no free lunch'
applies to all of us as well. We are all [carbon dioxide] emitters, and we cannot live off of this 'free
lunch', believing that is up to someone else to build a clean-energy future.").
'
78 See INSLEE & HENDRICKS, supra note 53, at 34.179 POSNER & WEISBACH, supra note 54, at 43.
80 See id
181 Laurie A. Wayburn & Anton A. Chiono, The Role of Federal Policy in Establishing
Ecosystem Service Markets, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 385, 390 (2002).
182 See Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges, supra note 145, at 278
("[G]lobal climate[] [is] [] largely self-healing in response to a broad range of human actions, until these
actions exceed some threshold.").
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obvious given that the atmosphere provides the planet's respiratory function
by absorbing carbon dioxide and emitting oxygen, which are essential
functions to human biological, cultural, and social reproduction.183 Thus,
climate change represents a global tragedy of the commons.
According to Hardin, the answer to this tragedy is either to impose
regulation or to privatize the commons. 184 The former refers to government
regulation imposing restrictions on access and use of the commons, either
through command-and-control measures or market-based incentives,
whereas the latter relies on converting the resource from non-property to
private property.185 This paper focuses on the market-based perspective.
In the past years, there has been a growing awareness that
environmental concerns entangle property rights issues. 186 Property rights
can help individuals internalize their externalities,187 as they create powerful
incentives to preserve the value of what people own.' 8 As stated by Terry
L. Anderson and Donald Leal's, the key to overcoming market failure -
climate change is the "greatest and widest-ranging" market failure 89 - is
to establish (1) well-specified,1 90 (2) enforceable,1 91 and (3) transferable 92
property rights. These are what Professor Carol M. Rose calls the
"modernist" features of property rights. 193
183 See VANDERHEIDEN, supra note 46, at 71.
184 See Hardin, supra note 152, at 1245; Terry L. Anderson & J. Bishop Grewell, Property
Rights Solution for the Global Commons: Bottom-Up or Top-Down? 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 73,
78; but also Elinor Ostrom, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 155, at 14 (criticizing the public-private dichotomy).
18 See Daniel H. Cole, Clearing the Air: Four Propositions About Property Rights and
Environmental Protection, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 103, 106-07 (1999) (suggesting that both
approaches actually constitute property-based solutions in that each involves the imposition of property
rights on formerly open-access resources).
186 WHO OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT?, supra note 152, at xi.
187 See ROSE ANNE DEVLIN & R. QUENTIN GRAFTON, ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL WRONGS 37-38 (1998).
188 See id; see also TERRY ANDERSON & DONALD LEAL, FREE MARKET
ENVIRONMENTALISM 165 (1991).
189 Stem, supra note 79, at 1.
190 ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 166, at 20 ("If physical attributes of the resources must be
specified in a clear and concise manner; they must be measurable . . . If property rights to resources
cannot be defined, then they obviously cannot be exchanged for other property rights."); TERRY L.
ANDERSON & LAURA E. HUGGINS, PROPERTY RIGHTS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FREEDOM AND
PROSPERITY 20 (2003) ("Definition makes it clear which individuals have what rights"); and Rose,
supra note 150, at 13 (arguing that rights must also "be capable of registration in widely-available
information systems.").
"' ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 166, at 20 ("Whenever the use of property cannot be
monitored or enforced, conflicts are inevitable and trades are impossible."); Rose, supra note 150, at 13
("[P]roperty rights... must be enforceable through public policing and juridical systems that are
available to potential owners from all over the globe.").
192 ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 166, at 21 ("Although well-defined and enforced rights
allow the owner to enjoy the benefits of using his property, legal restrictions on the sale of that property
preclude the potential for gains from trade."); and Rose, supra note 150, at 13 (claiming that property
rights should be relatively simple in form so that wide audiences understand them and willingly engage
in economic transactions).
193 Rose, supra note 150, at 13.
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Efforts to enhance conservation strategies through the creation of
property rights in environmental resources are being broadly
recommended. 194 Examples of these "new" forms of property rights in
environmental resources (also referred to as "environmental property
rights," "quasi-property rights," "regulatory rights," or "licensed property")
are tradable emission rights in the carbon markets or individual
transferrable quotas (ITQs) in the fishing industry.195 Even though tradable
emission rights or ITQs appear as "new" or "evolved" forms of property
rights, they rely on the "modernist" property features characterized by
Anderson and Leal. Accordingly, "environmental property rights" must be
well-defined, relatively simple, and uniform to understand. For these
property rights to work, "emissions [should] be monitored and measured;
and the amounts and types of emissions [should] be a matter of public
record" enforceable by administrators and courts. 196
Having explored the concept of "environmental property rights," in
the following lines this paper argues that the YGCs created by the Yasuni-
ITT Initiative are not well-defined, enforceable, and transferable rights. In
fact, even though the Yasuni Fund aims to contribute to mitigate GHG
emissions through the creation of a new currency (the YGCs), the problem
with the design of the proposal is that, in actuality, contributors to the fund
will not own anything at the end of the day.
194 See Jonathan H. Adler, Back to the Future of Conservation: Changing Perceptions of
Property Rights & Environmental Protection I N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 987 (2005) at 12; see also James
Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870 at 2 (2005) ("Over the last
decade there has been a sea change in environmental law and policy, marked by growing interest in
market-based instruments of environmental protection. In particular, approaches that explicitly
commodify environmental impacts by creating markets for their sale are on the rise. These
environmental trading markets (ETMs) now operate in a range of regulatory settings where parties
exchange credits to emit air pollutants, extract natural resources, and develop habitat. In fact, every
major environmental policy review in the last five years has called for even greater use of ETMs.
Markets for environmental commodities represent the new wave of environmental protection."); and
Terry L. Anderson, The Roles of Markets and Governments: Markets and the Environment: Friends or
Foes, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 81, 91 (2004)..
195 See, e.g., Rose supra note 150, at 6; LEIGH RAYMOND, PRIVATE RIGHTS IN PUBLIC
RESOURCES: EQUITY AND PROPERTY ALLOCATION IN MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 14
(2003) (distinguishing "licensed property," i.e. tradable emission rights, from private property in that the
former are subject to future cancellation or modification by the government without compensation to the
owner, whereas the latter are permanent rights. However secure, exclusive and well defined, he argues
that these are property that have been licensed to private owners rather than given or sold to them as a
fully vested legal right); and Matthieu Wemaere, et al., Legal Ownership and Nature ofKyoto Units and
EU Allowances, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF CARBON TRADING, KYOTO, COPENHAGEN AND BEYOND 35, 44
(David Freestone and Charlotte Streck eds., 2009) ("The resulting right represents a hybrid between a
purely public and a purely private right, which has been described as a 'regulatory' right. As a result,
emission rights are somewhere between an administrative grant and private property.").
196 Rose, supra note 150, at 22.
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The content of the YGCs is not clear and thus cannot be measured
or registered. YGCs are certificates issued by a sovereign state (Ecuador)
containing the unilateral promise to forgo part of its oil reserves (the ITT oil
reserves) for perpetuity. However, the YGCs do not represent a portion of
the oil reserves at stake, an oil barrel, or even a truly avoided carbon
emission. Contributors to the Yasuni Fund are buying nothing more than a
bona fide promise from Ecuador. Sadly enough, it is a promise that the
Ecuadorian government may breach sometime in the near future- despite
the fact that such an action would jeopardize its credibility-'9 subject to
the swings of political pendulums and the excruciating needs of every poor
nation. In fact, although oil exploitation within national parks or intangible
areas in Ecuador has been constitutionally restricted since 2008, it can still
be approved, though exceptionally, by the National Assembly in the name
of national interest.'9 8
It is true that the YGCs will include reference to the metric tons of
avoided carbon according to the price of the EUAs market at the time of the
transaction. Does this make them an avoided carbon emission? I think not,
since this feature is either merely referential (depending on how much and
when you pay, you will buy more or fewer avoided carbon emissions) or
subject to the future recognition of YGCs as carbon credits under current or
post-Kyoto regimes. Thus, the weakness of the YGCs relies on the mere
fact that they have been created in reference to other carbon markets, and
that their value depends on whether other carbon markets accept them as
inter-exchangeable currency in the future;199 what some refer to as the
"linking" of emissions trading regimes. 2 00 This linking is not straight-
forward and requires political maneuver.201
To see the problem more clearly, I will now compare the YGCs
with "Certified Emission Reduction" (CER) issued under the Kyoto
Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). A CER is a unit
197 Lavinia Warnars, The Yasuni-ITT Initiative: A New Model to Implement Human Rights
and Biological Diversity Conventions and Frameworks? Policy Matters 17, (2010)
http://www.terralingua.org/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2011/03/policymatters_17__pg55 77.pdf
98 See CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 20, 2008, art.
407.
199 See, e.g., Jillian Button, Carbon: Commodity or Currency? The Case for an International
Carbon Market Based on the Currency Model, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 571 (2008) (discussing
whether an "emission tradable right" qualifies as a currency, a commodity or a security).
200 See Michael Mehling, Linking of Emissions Trading Schemes, in LEGAL APSECTS OF
CARBON TRADING: KYOTO, COPENHAGEN AND BEYOND, supra note 177, at 112 ("[E]mission trading
schemes are linked if a participant in one scheme can use a carbon unit issued under another scheme to
meet compliance obligations. Thus, as a result of linking, units are considered equivalent for compliance
purposes without requiring some form of individual review and approval prior to each transaction.")
(internal citation omitted).
201 See Rival, supra note 7, at 362 ("For most carbon trade specialists.... obtaining funds for
avoided emissions from avoided oil extraction is not compatible with the EU ETS, or with any of the
emerging trading regimes. The circulation of CGYs, they thus claim, requires a political decision".)
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representing a ton of carbon dioxide sequestered or abated.202 "[CERs]
represent[] an entitlement to release a certain quantity of GHG[s] ... into to
the atmosphere."203 A CER is an effective and actual ton of carbon
reduction because it is issued after the implementation and monitoring of a
given CDM project in a developing country that is party to the Kyoto
Protocol and has effectively reduced carbon emissions due to the
"additionality" of that project.204 CERs "represent a reduction of GHG
emissions resulting from a defined project activity, calculated on the basis
of the comparison between the level of verified actual emissions and the
baseline scenario."205 Further, carbon reductions are "real and measurable
units,"206 which are monitored, verified, and issued by independent entities.
CERs are widely recognized in the Kyoto and voluntary carbon markets
and are easily exchangeable as a way to help Annex I parties fulfill their
reduction targets. 207 In short, CERs are well-defined, enforceable, and
transferable rights.
By contrast, the YGCs are not the product of a real, effective, and
measurable sustainable development project aimed to reduce carbon
emissions. They do not represent a ton of avoided carbon because the
certificate is issued according to the face value in US dollars of the
contribution, not the actual reduction. The amount is then converted to
referential carbon tons according to the amount paid in a given time. This is
why the YGCs are non-effective and non-actual avoided carbon reductions
issued by Ecuador, which is certainly not an independent body as it is the
one issuing CERs. The YGCs are therefore ill-defined, non-measurable, and
non-recordable unilateral promises. Simply put, the YGCs are paper-rights.
Second, the YGCs are not well suited to assure that Ecuador will
ultimately comply with its obligation to forgo the oil reserves in the
future.208 The incentives are not correctly aligned. No court, domestic or
202 Wemaere, et al., supra note 177, at 37.
203 Id
204 CDM RULEBOOK, http://www.cdmrulebook.org/84 (last visited Nov. 9, 2011).
("'Additionality' is a principal condition for the eligibility of a project under the CDM. A CDM project
activity is additional if anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases by sources are reduced below
those that would have occurred in the absence of the registered CDM project activity. In other words,
additionality is the requirement that the GHG emissions after implementation of a CDM project activity
are lower than those that would have occurred in the most plausible alternative scenario to the
implementation of the CDM project activity, such as the business-as-usual case (that is, the continuation
of current emission levels in the absence of the CDM project activity.") (emphasis added).
205 Wemaere, et al., supra note 177, at 43.
206 See id. at 44.
207 See id. at 35-37.
208 See THE ECONOMICS OF THE YASUNi INITIATIVE: CLIMATE CHANGE AS IF
THERMODYNAMICS MATTERED, supra note 1, at 25 ("The skeptic will fear that Ecuador will take the
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international, could solve any controversy around a YGC transaction or,
even worse, could dare to reverse a potential decision of Ecuador to exploit
the ITT oil reserves in spite of its prior engagement. As a sad anticipation
of what will happen sooner or later, the mere text of the certificate includes
a provision stating, "[ijn the event that the Government defaults on its
commitment and decides to initiate oil prospecting in the Yasuni ITT oil
fields, the YGCs will entitle the holders to be reimbursed by the
Government." 209 As they do not represent a right or a sufficient title, the
YGCs cannot stop Ecuador from breaching the oil moratorium.
Furthermore, given that an YGC is not a clear and recognizable currency to
the rest of the world, it cannot be easily and widely transferred across
borders.
For all the above reasons, YGCs do not represent "environmental
property rights," and are therefore insufficient to attain the objectives of the
initiative.
C. Lack ofInstitutional Framework
As discussed in the previous Section, one of the weaknesses of the
Yasuni-ITT Initiative is that it is a unilateral effort lacking an institutional
framework. Unlike carbon credit transactions under Kyoto Protocol, the
YGCs lack the institutional skeleton that gives CERs its definition,
measure, recordability, and tradability features. Although it is true that
some markets emerge without an institutional support, like the voluntary
market of carbon credits, it is also true that such markets have emerged
parallel to and inspired by the Kyoto CERs market.
The lack of an institutional framework may prove to be a real
210
obstacle for the replication of the proposal in other Amazonian states.
The eventual success of the project relies on the future availability (and
willingness) of other carbon markets to validate, homologate or convert the
YGCs as exchangeable currency equivalent to CERs or carbon credits,
money now and drill later. For this reason, the guarantee designed into the Yasuni-ITT Initiative will
help keep the incentives aligned should the political pendulum swing and some future government
repudiate the commitments made by the Correa government.").
209 TOR, supra note 28, at para. 29.
210 Many authors advocate the transplantation of the Yasuni scheme to other mega-diverse
countries. See e.g. Finer, Moncel and Jenkins, supra note 7, at 63 ("If successful, [the Yasuni Initiative]
could have major implications throughout the tropics, especially in areas with conflicts between natural
resource extraction and biodiversity protection"); Wamars, supra note 197, at 55-59 ("[The Yasuni
Initiative] may provide lessons for application of similar initiatives in other countries. . . . [It] can be
replicated by other developing countries containing significant fossil fuel reserves in highly biologically
and culturally sensitive areas such as Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and the Philippines."); and Laura Rival,
The Yasuni-ITT Initiative: Oil Development and alternative forms of wealth making in the Ecuadorian
Amazon, Conference organized by the Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, University of
Oxford, November 29, 2011 (claiming that the Yasuni Initiative is a model for other biodiversity rich
countries caught in the dilemma of choosing between oil exploitation or preserving the forest).
122 [Vol. 4 No. I
FROM KYOTO TO QUITO
whatever the conversion rate the parties agree on. Simply put, the YGCs
are conditioned on the future (and contingent) "linking" of carbon emission
trading schemes.
Unilateral efforts are courageous, mainly when they originate from
developing nations. But in the absence of institutional support, unilateral
endeavors like Ecuador's risk becoming ineffective or condemned to have
domestic relevance, if any.
D. Lack of Ripeness of Property Rights in Ecuador
Environmental property rights are sophisticated and complex forms
of property rights, which means they "are likely to come last of all in the
infrastructure train of roads, property rights, and environmental rights"
because they are more complex, have less political support, rely on
sophisticated monitoring systems, and are "expensive forms of public
infrastructure." 21 1 The problem with Ecuador, as with many other
developing nations, is that its property boundaries are not yet settled. As a
matter of fact, the boundaries of indigenous peoples' territories, such as the
Yasuni National Park and the ITT oil reserves, are not yet completely
defined in legal and physical terms. In the Amazonian region of Ecuador,
there is a convergence of conflicting and overlapping interests between
communities, state, and oil companies.212
Overall, Ecuador's property regime is characterized by a number of
"incompatible [and] competing uses [that] emerge as a result of conflicting
laws," the impossibility of surface users to exclude subsurface uses, and
213
weak law enforcement. It goes without saying that the existence of
numerous rights holders frustrates a socially desirable outcome. This
situation resembles the so-called "tragedy of the anti[-]commons," that is, a
situation where too many property rights wreck markets. 214
211 Rose, supra note 150, at 21, 23 and 24.
212 See Kristen Hite, Note, Back to the Basics: Improved Property Rights can Help Save
Ecuador's Rainforests, 16 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 763 (2004) (arguing that in Ecuador, current use-
specific national laws pose a number of conflicts, rendering insecure rights by lack of exclusive
ownership. Cultural systems vary widely in their land ownership systems, creating equitable concerns.
Subsurface rights infringe upon surface rights, precluding exclusive ownership. Enforcement of any
existing property rights is compounded by conflicting laws and a weak judiciary).
213 See id at 786.
214 See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK EcoNoMY: How Too MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECK
MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 2 (2008); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of
Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1197 ("If people fragment private property so that too many
people can exclude each other, then the resource may be wasted in a tragedy of the anticommons.");
Robert L. Scharf, A Common Tragedy: Condemnation and the Anticommons, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J.
165, 166-67 ("The anticommons is defined simply as the inefficient use of a specified piece of property
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In this context, where "modernist" property infrastructure is not yet
in place, new forms of property rights are difficult to appear. This means
that property rights cannot naturally evolve to the next generation of rights
because the Amazon lacks the minimum modernist features described
above. Hence, before moving toward a new system, Ecuador faces the
pending task of finalizing the construction of its "property infrastructure."
E. Disregard of Indigenous Peoples' Rights
Since 2007 different Ecuadorian agencies, in collaboration with
non-governmental organizations, have been discussing the Yasuni-ITT
Initiative. This paper provides no information on whether indigenous
peoples were consulted in the structuring of the proposal. What is clear,
though, is that indigenous peoples are not currently part of the management
of the Yasuni Fund, nor have they been empowered to participate in making
the decision as to what projects are to be executed with the funds raised. As
Davis contends:
It is not clear, however, how President Correa proposes to
handle the rights of indigenous peoples who call the ITT
oilfield and surrounding areas home. While he has
indicated that his proposal would protect these people's
traditional way of life, the details of this aspect of the
proposal have not yet fully emerged.215
Here I see two main contingencies. First, the lack of consultation
and participation of indigenous peoples affect the legitimacy of the project,
and may also amount to a violation of Ecuador's international human rights
obligations. Any decision that Ecuador undertakes with regard to the
Yasuni National Park has the potential to impinge on indigenous peoples'
free exercise of their ancestral territories, impairing their legal title and the
bundle of rights recognized therein.216 For this reason, the exclusion of
indigenous peoples from forest conservation strategies makes little sense,
that arises when multiple parties have the right to exclude all others from using that property, either in
part or in whole. In a sense, the anticommons is the mirror image of the commons, which occurs when
multiple owners have an unlimited right to use a limited resource. Whereas a commons typically results
in the overutilization of the shared resource, an anticommons generally results in the underutilization of
the shared resource.").
215 Davis, supra note 6, at 254.
216 Indigenous peoples' dissatisfaction for being excluded from the negotiating table on
Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) was recently evidenced in the
UNFCCC COP 17 held in Durban. See International Workgroup for Indigenous Affairs, Cop 17:
Implement safeguards on REDD Plus, indigenous caucus demands, available at:
http://www.iwgia.org/news/search-news?news id=421
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especially when they are the natural guardians of the forest they inhabit.217
Second, indigenous peoples may eventually sue the government in an
attempt to obtain an interest over the Yasuni Fund. Although the legality of
their claim may be contested (after all, indigenous peoples may own or
possess the surface lands but not the oil reserves), this may result in further
delays and more negotiations, deterring international cooperation through
the UNDP.
For these reasons, any alternative to abate climate change using the
lands of indigenous peoples, and most importantly, using the natural
resources located therein, must actively involve them.
F. Other Flaws
Here I will briefly comment on three other weaknesses of the
project. First, although the Yasuni National Park has an enormous
importance due to its biodiversity and ecosystem services, it occupies but a
small area in the Amazon forest. Given the modesty of its size, effective
conservation strategies should embrace larger areas of the tropical forests,
which would require celebrating alliances with other Amazonian nations
and coordinating land use planning.218
Second, there is a risk of leakage: while Ecuador may forgo its oil
reserves within the park, oil companies will move (and are already moving)
to other environmentally sensitive areas, driven by record oil prices and
growing global demand.219 Indeed, the park not only faces the
environmental threat of oil extraction activities within Ecuador, but also
from neighboring Peru.
Finally, the Yasuni-ITT Initiative does not address the possibility of
horizontal oil extraction. There is no certainty as to whether Ecuador's
217 See Donald M. Goldberg & Tracy Badua, Do People Have Legal Standing? Indigenous
Peoples, Global Warming and Human Rights, 11 BARRY L. REv. 59, 59-60 (2008) ("[A]greement seems
to be forming around the notion that many of the past problems with forest protection could have been
avoided if free, prior, and informed consent had been extended to those who know the forest best:
indigenous communities and cultures that have lived harmoniously in forests for many centuries. Thus,
the key questions may be whether decisions affecting indigenous peoples' lives will continue to be made
without their meaningful (as opposed to pro-forma) participation or whether indigenous communities
have the right to speak for the forests and their deep connection with them.").
218 Laura Rival, The Yasuni-ITT Initiative: Oil Development and alternative forms of wealth
making in the Ecuadorian Amazon, Conference organized by the Smith School of Enterprise and the
Environment, University of Oxford, November 29, 2011.
219 See Finer, Jenkins, Pimm, Keane, and Ross, supra note 7; and Laura Rival, The Yasuni-
17T Initiative: Oil Development and alternative forms of wealth making in the Ecuadorian Amazon,
Conference organized by the Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, University of Oxford,
November 29, 2011.
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moratorium would be unaffected in the event that the ITT fields can be
exploited outside the boundaries of the park.
E. Summary
In this Section, this paper has evidenced that President Correa's
proposal is ill suited to attain the objective of abating climate change.
Notwithstanding its cosmopolitan breadth, the proposal has several
structural problems that seriously affect its scope and transcendence, as
proven by the slow support that the project has received to date. To be fair,
some authors regard the Yasuni Initiative as a policy experiment, a unique
pilot-model, positing that we need trial and error to get somewhere.220
Precisely, this is the right time to make the necessary adjustments if this
scheme is to be replicated in other Amazonian countries. There are other
alternative options that may, from a property-based perspective, attain the
same objectives in forest conservation, protection of indigenous peoples,
and carbon sequestration in a more effective manner. These alternatives
will be addressed in the following and final Section.
V. THE ALTERNATIVES
This Section proposes three alternatives to President Correa's
model including: selling the oil reserves, valorizing ecosystem services, and
establishing conservation easements.
A. Selling the Oil Reserves
Ecuador's proposal is based on an oil moratorium, which relies
entirely on the good faith of the government. An alternative approach is to
sell the ITT oil reserves. By using a relatively simple purchase contract,
Ecuador could transfer, at market price, the ITT oil reserves to a third party,
such as, an NGO, corporation, trust, or any other legal vehicle. By
transferring the property of the oil reserves to an independent vehicle, the
decision of whether to exploit the oil reserves is taken away from the
political control of Ecuador. In this way, the contingency of a future
Ecuadorian government breaching the oil moratorium is eliminated
significantly. (Note, though, that this alternative model cannot eliminate the
220 See e.g. Rival, supra note 7, at 362; Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric systems for coping with
collective action and global environmental change, Global Environmental Change 20 (2010) 550-557,
at 556 ("Rather than only a global effort, it would be better to self-consciously adopt a polycentric
approach to the problem of climate change in order to gain benefits at multiple scales as well as to
encourage experimentation and learning from diverse policies adopted at multiple scales".); and
Warnars supra note 197, at 59.
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political contingency completely, as the risk of expropriation or a taking is
latent anyway).
This model has the advantage of creating well-defined, enforceable,
and tradable rights. The contributor would not have a paper-right (such as a
YGC), but rather would hold a share, a quota, an interest or other
entitlement over the oil reserves, or even a number of oil barrels, according
to the vehicle chosen for the transaction, granting him the right to exclude
others. Thus, in this property-based scheme, rights are well-defined (the
contributor owns part of the oil reserves), enforceable (controversies are
solved by state courts or arbitration according to the contract), and
transferable (rights can be transferred freely to other parties).
However promising, selling the oil reserves is not legal under in
Ecuador, since natural resources belong to the state and are inalienable
pursuant to Ecuador's Constitution.221 While the state is entitled to award
contracts to explore and exploit natural resources to private parties, it
cannot award private property over the oil reserves itself. Unless a
constitutional amendment is undertaken, selling the oil reserves has to be
discarded as a feasible alternative to the Yasuni-ITT model. Of course, the
acquisition of the exploitation rights from PetroEcuador for conservation
purposes is a legal alternative to the alienation of the oil reserves, though
the costs may be prohibitive for conservation NGOs.
B. Valorizing Ecosystem Services
Deforestation causes 3.6 to 4.5 billion tons of carbon dioxide
emissions per year.222 This represents around seventeen percent of total
global emissions, which is more than the global transport sector.223 This is
why "[i]f society is . . . serious about climate change mitigation, there is
little choice but to develop programs that increase the carbon stock in
forests." 2 24 Forest ecosystems sequester and store vast amounts of carbon
221 CONSTITUCION ECUADOR [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 20, 2008, art. 317 ("Nonrenewable
natural resources are part of the unalienable heritage of the State and are not subject to a statute of
limitations. In the management of these resources, the State shall give priority to responsibility between
generations, the conservation of nature, the charging of royalties or other non-tax contributions and
corporate shares; and shall minimize the negative impacts of an environmental, cultural, social and
economic nature.").
222 Brent Sohgen, Forestry Carbon Sequestration, in SMART SOLUTIONS TO CLIMATE
CHANGE: COMPARING COSTS AND BENEFITS 114 (Bjorn Lomborg ed., 2010).
223 id
224 d
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dioxide.225 When forest areas are cleared for agricultural or other purposes
the carbon stored within these ecosystems is released226 and their ability to
sequester more carbon in the future is lost.227 Carbon sequestration carried
out by primary forests is an example of what ecologists and economists call
44 ,228
ecosystem services. Ecosystem services are "processes of ecosystems
that directly or indirectly support human well-being . . . such as the
regulation of global climate.229 Ecosystem services are generally taken for
granted. Most countries and citizens are free riding by profiting from the
clean air and carbon offsetting the Amazon forest provides, but not sharing
the costs for its preservation.230
Currently, efforts to valorize ecosystem services are undertaken in
different parts of the world. Although such mechanisms were not
adequately addressed under the Kyoto Protocol, current discussions within
the UNFCCC include programs like REDD.231 One way of valorizing
ecosystem services is to pay Ecuador to preserve forest mass. This "forest
carbon offset" approach is relatively simple and has been considered for
232Intisfuture international agreements. In this scheme poor governments are
compensated to reforest or not deforest in exchange for emission credits to
be traded in voluntary carbon markets.233
The application of the "forest carbon offset" approach to the Yasuni
National Park would find great sympathy in the international community,
even in a context of uncertainty concerning the post-Kyoto rules, as it is
considered "an internationally accepted measure to mitigate climate
change." 2 34 This alternative model places the incentives correctly. It fosters
225 See David Takacs, Carbon Into Gold: Forest Carbon Offsets, Climate Change
Adaptation, and International Law, 15 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 39, 56 (2009) ("Half
of the global terrestrial carbon pool is stored in forests.").
226 See id
227 See Wayburn & Chiono, supra note 181, at 391.
228 See Salzman, supra note 194, at 872 ("Largely taken for granted, healthy ecosystems
provide a variety of such critical services. Created by the interactions of living organisms with their
environment, these 'ecosystem services' provide both the conditions and processes that sustain human
life-purifying air and water, detoxifying and decomposing waste, renewing soil fertility, regulating
climate, mitigating droughts and floods, controlling pests, and pollinating plants.").
229 Wayburn & Chiono, supra note 181, at 393.
230 See Charlotte Streck et al., Climate Change and Forestry: An Introduction, in CLIMATE
CHANGE AND FORESTS: EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 7 (Charlotte Streck et al. eds.,
2008) ("Many of the benefits provided by forests are currently considered part of the global commons
and are freely available for everybody.").
231 See id at 6-7.
232 See Takacs, supra note 196, at 56-57 ("[A] project developer plants trees to reforest a
degraded ecosystem, or ensures that a forest that would have been degraded or felled is, instead,
preserved. The developer can then sell the carbon, in the form of carbon credits now sequestered in the
trees and soil, for a contracted period of time.").
233 See id. at 59.
234 Jan Fehse, Forest Carbon and Other Ecosystem Services: Synergies between the Rio
Conventions, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS: EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES,
supra note 201, at 59.
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Ecuador to conserve, protect, and restore its forests in order to obtain the
carbon credits that it can later sell to developed nations. Developing policy
mechanisms that provide incentives for forest protection "would help
minimize the current market failures that allow for the destruction of
tropical forests worldwide."235 The money obtained could be invested in
"public programs and policies aimed at enforcing environmental legislation,
thus providing support for economic alternatives to felling of the forests."236
One of the crucial questions that emerges in the context of REDD
is how the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities will be
protected,237 given that "these initiatives may affect the property rights of
indigenous peoples, who may find that access or use has been restricted or
curtailed altogether on lands used for these projects."238 This avoided
deforestation approach would require involving indigenous peoples in the
program, not only to avoid potential human rights contingencies, but also to
ensure the conservation objectives in the long run. Thus, REDD programs
ought to consider indigenous peoples' rights such as sharing in the financial
benefits, the rights to participate in decision-making, and the rights to have
their knowledge about forestry resources respected. 239 To be clear, I
understand that this will not be simple or cheap, as the transaction costs of
negotiating with each indigenous community are significant.
Yet, carbon offsetting is not a panacea solution. There are some
considerable difficulties related to valorizing and compensating ecosystem
services as complex as carbon sequestration. First, no one can assure that
the trees will stand forever. Sooner or later they will be cut down for
agricultural uses or will be lost to fire, pests or other disruptions. 24 0 So,
even though carbon offsetting through avoided deforestation may have
temporary benefits, as well as act as a bridge to clean energy, it would not
provide a permanent solution.217 Second, this model has a risk of creating a
"leakage effect": restoring a forest in one place would lead someone else to
235 Rosimeiry Portella et al., The Idea of Market-Based Mechanisms for Forest Conservation
and Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS: EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET
OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 201, at 23.
236 Stephan Schwartzman & Paulo Mouthinho, Compensated Reductions: Rewarding
Developing Countries for Protecting Forest Carbon, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS: EMERGING
POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 201, at 231.
237 See Rosemary Lyster, REDD+, Transparency, Participation and Resource Rights: The
Role ofLaw, 14 ENvTL. SC. & POL'Y, no. 2, March 2011, at 118-12.
238 Goldberg & Badua, supra note 191, at 66.
239 See Lyster, supra note 208.
240 See Robert O'Sullivand & Rick Saines, International Market Solutions to Tropical
Rainforests, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF CARBON TRADING: KYOTO, COPENHAGEN, AND BEYOND, supra note
177, at 591.
217 See DeLay, supra note 146, at 74.
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deforest elsewhere due to market pressures. "[The] government may
preserve one forest from planned logging and instead offer timber
concessions elsewhere[,] [while] logging companies [put out of business] .
. . in one country may instead cut timber in a neighboring country." 241
Third, monitoring and certification costs can be considerably expensive.
They not only require putting in place surveillance technology, but also
calculating carbon absorption over time, which poses serious technical
challenges, particularly in varying climate change scenarios. 242 Fourth, this
scheme requires allocating potential carbon credits. In Ecuador, this is
troublesome as it is not yet clear who will be entitled to carbon credits vis-
A-vis the conflicting rights between indigenous peoples, oil companies and
the government. Finally, and most importantly, this model relies on the
actions of the government. As in the Yasuni-ITT Initiative, there is a latent
and unavoidable risk that the government could decide in the future to use
the lands to increase its agricultural frontier. When political actors control
the solution, there is an enormous risk of deviation in the objectives.
The valorization of ecosystem services shall not be completely
discarded as sound environmental policy. Even so, there is another way of
attaining the same objectives in a more efficient manner: the establishment
of conservation easements over the Yasuni National Park.
C. Establishing Conservation Easements
"Conservation easements [] present a powerful alternative to
traditional command and control approaches," as broad prohibitions to clear
forestlands have proven to be ineffective methods to deter deforestation in
the Amazon.2 43 For an Amazonian landowner, it seems to be more lucrative
to deforest and sell timber or agricultural products than to maintain the trees
standing. 24 This is why the conveyance of conservation easements would
provide private landowners enough economic incentives to preserve natural
forests instead of clearing them.
Conservation easements are legal instruments that help valorize
ecosystem services provided by the forest by incentivizing landowners not
to cut down the trees or to reforest previously logged areas in exchange for
compensation. In the United States, conservation easements are the fastest-
growing method for protecting land and attaining land protection goals, 245
241 Takacs, supra note 196, at 58.
242 See id
243 See Hite, supra note 212, at 788.
244 See Salzman, supra note 194, at 960; and MONICA GRILL, GLOBAL WARMING FORESTS:
DEGRADATION AND DEFORESTATION, WORLD JURIST ASSOCIATION, ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE, A
SURVEY OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAWS (2010).
245 See PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 22
(Julie Ann Gustanski & Roserick H. Squires eds., 2000); and Zachary Bray, Reconciling Development
130 [Vol. 4 No. I
2011-2012] FROM KYOTO TO QUITO 131
though they are not exempt from criticism.246 A conservation easement is a
non-possessory interest in a parcel of land247 created by deeds that remove
certain "destructive" uses from the land. It imposes perpetual contractual
limitationS248 and affirmative obligations to protect natural, scenic, or open-
space values of real property, thus assuring its availability for forest
conservation.2 4 9 This ensures they "can continue to harbor the carbon
already sequestered and to sequester more carbon as time passes."250
Simply put, this property-based instrument implies that economic
incentives are more efficient than mere governmental prohibitions to adjust
people's conduct.
Conservation easements are a mixture of different legal concept.
They include some attributes of contracts, real property easements, and
charitable trusts.2 51 In the United States, conservation easements are mainly
statutory creations.252 Although conservation easements vary between
states, they are generally characterized by the following features: 25 3 First,
they grant a right or interest in real property, in the form of a restriction,
easement, covenant, or condition to protect natural or scenic value; promote
forest, recreational or agricultural use; enhance air or water quality;
preserve historical or archaeological features; protect habitat or
and Natural Beauty: The Promise and Dilemma of Conservation Easements, HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
119, 125 (2010) (noting that in 2005 the total acreage protected in the United States by state and local
land trusts was 37 million acres, that is, more than sixteen times the size of Yellowstone National Park).
246 See Bray, supra note 216, at 136 ("The response in both the legal academic literature and
the popular press to the rapid growth in the number of private land trusts and the total acreage protected
by conservation easements has been mixed. Legal scholars disagree about the efficacy and efficiency of
conservation easements, the likelihood of their durability, the flexibility with which they suit diverse
current conservation norms, their ability to adapt to shifting conservation norms in the future, and their
distributional fairness. For some, conservation easements represent a cheap, flexible, decentralized, and
cost-effective way to protect land with important conservation attributes. Others believe that
conservation easements, and their rapid recent growth, constitute an under-examined and unwise use of
limited public funds and conservation resources - one that causes potentially unfair distributional side
effects in the present and that may lock future generations into inefficient and undesirable conservation
commitments in the future.") (internal citations omitted).
247 See Daniel L. Aaronson & Michael B. Manuel, Conversation Easements and Climate
Change, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 27 (Winter 2008) ("[I]t allows its holder, typically a land
trust, to protect land without the necessity of owning and managing the property.").
8 See generally Nancy A. McLaughin, Conservation Easements: Perpetuity and Beyond, 34
ECOLOGY L.Q. 673 (2007) (highlighting the "perpetual" nature of conservation easements, but also the
difficulties thereof).
249 Melissa Waller Baldwin, Conservation Easements: A Viable Tool for Land Preservation,
32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 89, 105 (1997).
250 James L. Olmsted, Climate Surfing: A Conceptual Guide to Drafting Conservation
Easements in the Age of Global Warming, 23 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 765, 808 (2008-2009).
251 C. TIMOTHY LINDSTROM, A TAX GUIDE TO CONSERVATION EASEMENTS 4 (2008).
252 Id. at 4-5.
253 See generally PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT AND,
supra note 216, at 26-54.
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biodiversity. Second, the landowner is not deprived of possession, but the
easement implies a collection of restrictions and affirmative obligations,
limiting the exercise of certain ownership rights according to the
preservation objectives. Third, they can be conveyed for a fixed term or
perpetuity, and they bind present and future owners of the property with
regard to the restricted activity.254 Fourth, conservation easements can be
recorded in the Public Registry and be enforced in courts, though arbitration
is the common option of the parties. And finally, they are subject to tax
benefits.255
In light of this framework, a carbon sequestering easement should
be conveyed over the surface lands comprised by the Yasuni National
256Park. As mentioned earlier, the park is located over public and communal
land, so establishing conservation easements would not be feasible until
conflicting interests around the Yasuni National Park are settled. Therefore,
this proposal presumes that boundaries are clearly defined and surface lands
titled and recorded. "The natural candidates for conservation market-
makers are environmental NGOs" 257 that may offer payments to Ecuador or
indigenous peoples for conservation easements on their lands. In addition to
NGOs, affluent citizens also can contribute to financing these programs.
There are a variety of advantages to this model. First, the rights
conveyed in a conservation easement can be characterized as well-defined
(the limitations on the rights of the landowner are clearly established on a
contract which is recordable in the public registry, bind present and future
owners, and can even be fixed for perpetuity); enforceable (the rights of
both parties can be enforced by courts or arbitration tribunal); and tradable
environmental property rights (the contractual rights can be transferred
freely to other parties, without affecting the main conservation obligations
stipulated in the contract). Therefore, conservation easements are
"environmental property rights" with "modernist" features that guarantee
long-term conservation results.
Second, conservation easements can be sufficiently lucrative to the
government of Ecuador as landowner for it to respect its contractual
obligations to protect the forests and forgo its right to exploit the ITT oil
254 See Baldwin, supra note 249, at 106.
255 Maureen Rudolph & Adrian Gosch, A Practitioner's Guide to Drafting Conservation
Easements and the Tax Implications, 4 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 143, 183 ("The federal and
state governments have seen the necessity and importance of preserving land for environmental
purposes. Therefore, they reward those landowners who donate some rights in their property enabling
that property to be used by a government agency or charitable organization for the public benefit. The
federal government has passed laws that provide large tax incentives, which allow for the taxpayer to
keep more of his money. The taxpayer can reap the benefits of these laws in the area of his personal
federal income tax, federal gift tax, federal estate tax and state's property tax.").
256 See Olmsted, supra note 250, at 798-807 (classifying conservation easements in perpetual
park easements, non-perpetual park easements, and carbon sequestering easements).
257 Hite, supra note 212, at 788.
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reserves. Nothing impedes combining a conservation easement with carbon
offsetting measures. In other words, it is possible to include carbon
emission rights for avoided GHG emissions in conservation easement
schemes, thus providing additional revenues for surface landowners.
Third, in contrast to President Correa's proposal, a conservation
easement will not affect indigenous peoples' possession of the lands, but it
presupposes their cooperation to fulfill the conservation objectives in a
comprehensive manner. Conservation easements are bottom-up measures
that recognize that private citizens tend to be in a better position than
centralized decision makers to manage forests on their lands. 25 Hence, they
serve to empower local players by incentivizing them to take action in
protecting their own lands,260 without dispossession.26 1 Moreover,
communal landowners would have the carrots to better monitor their
properties, enhancing the overall surveillance of forests.262 To maximize
their investments, they would likely resort to better training and technology
to develop inventories and estimate carbon stocks.263 Active surveillance
also provides an additional source of work for local communities.
To conclude, conservation easements are well-suited property-
based instruments and are adequate programs to materialize cosmopolitan
goals. Such measures demand the voluntary and personal contributions of
all capable citizens to help abate climate change and serve as an instrument
for cosmopolitan climate justice.
258 See generally James L. Olmsted, Carbon Dieting: Latent Ancillary Rights to Carbon
Offsets in Conservation Easements, 29 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 121 (2009).
259 See F.A. Hayek, The Use ofKnowledge in Society, THE AM. EcoN. REV. 519, 524 (1945)
("If we can agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes in
the particular circumstances of time and place, it would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must
be left to the people who are familiar with these circumstances, who know directly of the relevant
changes of the resources immediately available to them to meet them. We cannot expect that this
problem will be solved by first communicating all this knowledge to a central board which, after
integrating all knowledge, issues its orders. We must solve it by some form of decentralization."); and
Ostrom, supra note 127, at 555 ("What we have learned from extensive research is that when
individuals are well informed about the problem they face and about who else is involved, and can build
settings where trust and reciprocity can emerge, grow, and be sustained over time, costly and positive
actions are frequently taken without waiting for an external authority to impose rules, monitor
compliance, and assess penalties.").
260 See generally Steven A. Kennett et al., Property Rights and the Legal Framework for
Carbon Sequestration on Agricultural Land, 37 OTTAWA L. REV. 171 (2005-2006).
261 See generally ANTHONY ANELLA & JOHN B. WRIGHT, SAVING THE RANCH:
CONVERSATION EASEMENT DESIGN IN THE AMERICAN WEST (2004).
262 See BEATRIZ GARCIA, THE AMAZON FROM AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 249
(2011).
263 See id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Climate change affects all human beings regardless of where they
live and what citizenship they hold. Immediate and effective global
measures are required to solve this global "tragedy of the commons." From
a cosmopolitan justice approach, this paper shows that each individual has
the moral duty toward all human beings to reduce his GHG emissions by
engaging, for example, in carbon-offsetting voluntary programs that finance
conservation easements in the Amazon, and thus, mitigating the
excruciating and transnational effects of climate change.
Notwithstanding this critique of President Correa's model, one
virtue of the Yasuni-ITT Initiative is that it represents a call from the
developing world to the developed world for the immediate adoption of
globally effective measures within the UNFCCC fora, such as the adoption
of REDD or similar programs, amid this period of diplomatic
procrastination. The Amazonian countries desperately claim for the
valorization of the ecosystem services that their forests provide to the world
for free. It is time the affluent citizens stop free riding and begin to pay for
the carbon absorption and climate regulation services provided by the
largest rainforest on Earth.
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